The Turnover Trap: New Leaders, Reputation, and International Conflict
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
A formal model of crisis bargaining in the shadow of leadership turnover is analyzed where (1) successive leaders of the same state may differ in their resolve, (2) their resolve is private information, and (3) the probability of leadership turnover depends on bargaining behavior and conflict outcomes. The model provides novel answers to a number of questions about the relationship between an incumbent's time in office, the prospects of losing office, the anticipated behavior of future leaders, and the current probability of conflict. Taken together, these results add further weight to recent claims that leaders, not states, should be considered the fundamental units of analysis in international relations.
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Cites
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217
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Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War
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Cited by
Reputation and Status as Motives for War
Dafoe, A., Renshon, J., & Huth, P. (2014) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-071112-213421 · Cited by 322
Metadata
- Authors
- Wolford, S.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2007-10
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 772-788
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5907
- OpenAlex
- W2144298621
- Cited by
- 210
- References
- 46
- FWCI
- 20.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Wolford, S. (2007). The Turnover Trap: New Leaders, Reputation, and International Conflict. American Journal of Political Science. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00280.x
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.