The DOI matches its Crossref record; 84 of the 84 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and the Survival of Authoritarian Rulers1
Abstract
This paper examines whether economic sanctions destabilize authoritarian rulers. We argue that the effect of sanctions is mediated by the type of authoritarian regime against which sanctions are imposed. Because personalist regimes and monarchies are more sensitive to the loss of external sources of revenue (such as foreign aid and taxes on trade) to fund patronage, rulers in these regimes are more likely to be destabilized by sanctions than leaders in other types of regimes. In contrast, when dominant single-party and military regimes are subject to sanctions, they increase their tax revenues and reallocate their expenditures to increase their levels of cooptation and repression. Using data on sanction episodes and authoritarian regimes from 1960 to 1997 and selection-corrected survival models, we test whether sanctions destabilize authoritarian rulers in different types of regimes. We find that personalist dictators are more vulnerable to foreign pressure than other types of dictators. We also analyze the modes of authoritarian leader exit and find that sanctions increase the likelihood of a regular and an irregular change of ruler, such as a coup, in personalist regimes. In single-party and military regimes, however, sanctions have little effect on leadership stability.
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Cites
The Origins of Totalitarianism
Arendt, H. (2018) · Princeton Readings in Political Thought · doi:10.2307/j.ctv19fvzzk.50 · Cited by 5,173
The Logic of Political Survival
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003) · doi:10.7551/mitpress/4292.001.0001 · Cited by 4,217
Ross, M. L. (2001) · World Politics · doi:10.1353/wp.2001.0011 · Cited by 3,409
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990
Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511804946 · Cited by 2,845
Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable
Beck, N., Katz, J. N., & Tucker, R. (1998) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.2307/2991857 · Cited by 2,471
Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective
Bratton, M., & Walle, N. V. D. (1997) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139174657 · Cited by 1,838
Democracy and Development: List of Tables and Figures
Przeworski, A., Álvarez, M. E., Cheibub, J. A., & Limongi, F. (2000) · Cited by 1,686
Back to the Future: Modeling Time Dependence in Binary Data
Carter, D. B., & Signorino, C. S. (2010) · Political Analysis · doi:10.1093/pan/mpq013 · Cited by 1,673
The Origins of Totalitarianism
Meyer, H., & Arendt, H. (1959) · Books Abroad · doi:10.2307/40097039 · Cited by 1,603
Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico
Magaloni, B. (2006) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511510274 · Cited by 1,554
Cited by
Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice
Drezner, D. W. (2011) · International Studies Review · doi:10.1111/j.1468-2486.2010.01001.x · Cited by 411
Authoritarian regime types revisited: updated data in comparative perspective
Wahman, M., Teorell, J., & Hadenius, A. (2013) · Contemporary Politics · doi:10.1080/13569775.2013.773200 · Cited by 360
Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy
Peksen, D., & Drury, A. C. (2010) · International Interactions · doi:10.1080/03050629.2010.502436 · Cited by 265
Dynamics of regime personalization and patron–client networks in Russia, 1999–2014
Baturo, A., & Elkink, J. A. (2016) · Post-Soviet Affairs · doi:10.1080/1060586x.2015.1032532 · Cited by 73
Institutional stepping stones for democracy: how and why multipartyism enhances democratic change
Teorell, J., & Wahman, M. (2018) · Democratization · doi:10.1080/13510347.2017.1318279 · Cited by 50
Metadata
- Authors
- Escribà-Folch, A., & Wright, J.
- Venue
- International Studies Quarterly
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2010-06-07
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 335-359
- ISSN
- 0020-8833 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2478
- OpenAlex
- W2105479648
- Cited by
- 275
- References
- 84
- FWCI
- 23.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.