Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Competition in U.S. House elections has been declining for more than 50 years and, based on both incumbent reelection rates and the percentage of close races, the 2002 and 2004 House elections were the least competitive of the postwar era. This article tests three hypotheses that attempt to explain declining competition in House elections: the redistricting hypothesis, the partisan polarization hypothesis, and the incumbency hypothesis. We find strong support for both the partisan polarization hypothesis and the incumbency hypothesis but no support for the redistricting hypothesis. Since the 1970s there has been a substantial increase in the number of House districts that are safe for one party and a substantial decrease in the number of marginal districts. However, this shift has not been caused by redistricting but by demographic change and ideological realignment within the electorate. Moreover, even in the remaining marginal districts most challengers lack the financial resources needed to wage competitive campaigns. The increasing correlation among district partisanship, incumbency, and campaign spending means that the effects of these three variables tend to reinforce each other to a greater extent than in the past. The result is a pattern of reinforcing advantages that leads to extraordinarily uncompetitive elections.
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Cited by
Red Media, Blue Media: Evidence of Ideological Selectivity in Media Use
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Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?
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It’s Nothing Personal: The Decline of the Incumbency Advantage in US House Elections
Jacobson, G. C. (2015) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/681670 · Cited by 325
Why Can't We All Just Get Along? The Reality of a Polarized America
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Abramowitz, A. I., Alexander, B., & Gunning, M.
- Venue
- The Journal of Politics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 2006-02
- Volume
- 68
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 75-88
- ISSN
- 0022-3816 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2508
- OpenAlex
- W2048236208
- Cited by
- 318
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 29.68
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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