The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Do Better‐Governed Australian Firms Make More Informative Disclosures?
Abstract
We investigate whether and if so, how, corporate governance ‘quality’1 is related to the information flows from a company and how the share market and its agents respond. Specifically, we study links between the ‘quality’ of a firm's corporate governance (CGQ) and the informativeness of its disclosures. We employ six indicators of informativeness. They include document counts, properties of analysts’ forecasts and a ‘timeliness’ metric, in the spirit of Ball and Brown (1968), that reflects the average speed of price discovery throughout the year. Our results suggest the answer to our question is ‘Yes’: better‐governed firms do make more informative disclosures.
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Cites
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Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers
Ball, R., & Brown, P. (1968) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2490232 · Cited by 6,361
Self-citationCorporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings1
Basu, S. (1997) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(97)00014-1 · Cited by 3,982
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The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings Management*
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Cited by
Disclosure processing costs, investors’ information choice, and equity market outcomes: A review
Blankespoor, E., deHaan, E., & Marinovic, I. (2020) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2020.101344 · Cited by 1,076
Ntim, C. G., & Soobaroyen, T. (2013) · Corporate Governance: An International Review · doi:10.1111/corg.12026 · Cited by 680
Corporate governance, accounting and finance: A review
Brown, P., Beekes, W., & Verhoeven, P. (2011) · Accounting & Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1467-629x.2010.00385.x · Cited by 614
Self-citationCorporate governance, accountability and mechanisms of accountability: an overview
Brennan, N. M., & Solomon, J. (2008) · Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal · doi:10.1108/09513570810907401 · Cited by 538
Analysing the determinants of narrative risk information in UK FTSE 100 annual reports
Abraham, S., & Cox, P. (2007) · The British Accounting Review · doi:10.1016/j.bar.2007.06.002 · Cited by 507
Metadata
- Authors
- Beekes, W., & Brown, P.
- Venue
- Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-04
- Volume
- 33
- Issue
- 3-4
- Pages
- 422-450
- ISSN
- 0306-686X (ISSN-L)
- 1468-5957
- OpenAlex
- W3126066042
- Cited by
- 299
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 54.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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