Deafness, Conversation and Theory of Mind

Abstract

Abstract The child's developing theory of the mind as an interconnected network of beliefs, desires and feelings that govern behaviour provides a cornerstone for social and intellectual life. Recent research has suggested that autistic children have difficulty acquiring such a theory. Although it is speculated that a specific neurological deficit may be responsible for autistic children's difficulties on false belief tasks devised to lest a theory of mind, these may also be due to a lack of exposure to conversation about mental states. In this study we explored the development of a theory of mind in a group of 26 signing, prelingually‐deaf Australian children of normal intelligence, aged 8–13 years. Results revealed that 65% of these deaf children failed a simple test of false belief which normal preschoolers, mentally retarded children, and other handicapped groups–apart from children with autism–routinely pass at a mental age of 4–5 years. No significant difference emerged between deaf children's performance and that of autistic children tested on the same task in previous research. We discuss the results in terms of a conversational account of the development of a theory of mind in deaf children, and the extent to which this account is applicable to children with autism.