Cited by 8,743Child and Animal Learning DevelopmentPrimate Behavior and EcologySocial Robot Interaction and HRI

Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?

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Premack, David, Woodruff, Guy·1978·Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Abstract

An individual has a theory of mind if he imputes mental states to himself and others. A system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory because such states are not directly observable, and the system can be used to make predictions about the behavior of others. As to the mental states the chimpanzee may infer, consider those inferred by our own species, for example, purpose or intention , as well as knowledge, belief, thinking, doubt, guessing, pretending, liking , and so forth. To determine whether or not the chimpanzee infers states of this kind, we showed an adult chimpanzee a series of videotaped scenes of a human actor struggling with a variety of problems. Some problems were simple, involving inaccessible food – bananas vertically or horizontally out of reach, behind a box, and so forth – as in the original Kohler problems; others were more complex, involving an actor unable to extricate himself from a locked cage, shivering because of a malfunctioning heater, or unable to play a phonograph because it was unplugged. With each videotape the chimpanzee was given several photographs, one a solution to the problem, such as a stick for the inaccessible bananas, a key for the locked up actor, a lit wick for the malfunctioning heater. The chimpanzee's consistent choice of the correct photographs can be understood by assuming that the animal recognized the videotape as representing a problem, understood the actor's purpose, and chose alternatives compatible with that purpose.

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  1. Premack D. Cognitive principles? In: F. J. McGuigan and D. B. Lumsden (eds.), Contemporary Approaches to Conditioning and Learning, pp. 287–319, 1973.

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Authors
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G.
Affiliations
University of Pennsylvania (US)
Venue
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Published
1978-12
Volume
1
Issue
4
Pages
515-526
ISSN
  • 0140-525X (ISSN-L)
  • 1469-1825
OpenAlex
W2141538250
Cited by
8,743
References
7
Citations by year
2026: 343 · 2025: 438 · 2024: 395 · 2023: 437 · 2022: 466 · 2021: 549 · 2020: 438 · 2019: 410 · 2018: 460 · 2017: 377 · 2016: 341 · 2015: 389 · 2014: 375 · 2013: 353 · 2012: 312
FWCI
23.78
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
Behavioral and Brain Sciences (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation (7519748, 7716853)
  • National Institutes of Health
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Primate Behavior and Ecology
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Social Robot Interaction and HRI
Keywords
theory of mind, chimpanzees, mental state attribution, intention inference, problem solving, animal cognition, social cognition

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