Heart Rate and Skin Conductance in Anticipation of Shocks With Varying Probability of Occurrence
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In Experiment I,S s in each of four groups were given 8 shocks in either 8, 11, 16, or 32 trials, confounding probability with number of trials. Each trial was a countdown period of 30 sec, with an ITI of 30 sec. There were no shock probability effects using either heart rate (HR) or skin conductance (SC), with respect either to average within trial changes or to average pre‐shock levels relative to rest. In every group after a large acceleration in Trial 1, HR subsided and stabilized; SC rose steadily throughout the session. In Experiment II, S s in each of four groups were given either 5, 10, 15, or 20 shocks in 20 trials, confounding probability with number of shocks. In addition to the large HR acceleration in the first trial, there were in this case between‐group differences in HR, which were a direct function of number and probability of shocks. Skin conductance did not discriminate the groups, though it rose in all groups both within and across trials. Experiment III, a partial replication of Experiment II, showed that the HR differences in Experiment II failed to repeat when the shock intensity was reduced; and SC no longer increased over trials.
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Citations
Cites
Preference for information about an uncertain but unavoidable outcome.
Lanzetta, J. T., & Driscoll, J. M. (1966) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0022674 · Cited by 107
Cited by
Loewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Welch, N. (2001) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.127.2.267 · Cited by 5,955
“The probability of receiving the shock, however, does not affect arousal (Bankhart & Elliott, 1974; Elliott, 1975; Monat, Averill, & Lazarus, 1972; Snortum & Wilding, 1971) except for trials in which the probability is stated to be zero.”
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.90.4.293 · Cited by 3,991
Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment
Bottom, W. P., Gilovich, T., Griffin, D., & Kahneman, D. (2004) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/20159081 · Cited by 3,536
Representativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intuitive judgment.
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002) · Heuristics and Biases · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511808098.004 · Cited by 3,476
Norm theory: Comparing reality to its alternatives.
Kahneman, D., & Miller, D. T. (1986) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.93.2.136 · Cited by 3,024
Metadata
- Authors
- Peter Bankart, C., & Elliott, R.
- Venue
- Psychophysiology
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1974-03
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 160-174
- ISSN
- 0048-5772 (ISSN-L)
- 1469-8986
- OpenAlex
- W2054863013
- Cited by
- 93
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 1.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Peter Bankart, C., & Elliott, R. (1974). Heart Rate and Skin Conductance in Anticipation of Shocks With Varying Probability of Occurrence. Psychophysiology. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8986.1974.tb00836.x
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