Cited by 5,955Decision-Making and Behavioral EconomicsRisk Perception and ManagementLeadership, Behavior, and Decision-Making Studies

Risk as feelings.

Loewenstein, George F., Weber, Elke U., Hsee, Christopher K., Welch, Ned·2001·Psychological Bulletin

Abstract

Virtually all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. They assume that people assess the desirability and likelihood of possible outcomes of choice alternatives and integrate this information through some type of expectation-based calculus to arrive at a decision. The authors propose an alternative theoretical perspective, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect experienced at the moment of decision making. Drawing on research from clinical, physiological, and other subfields of psychology, they show that emotional reactions to risky situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks. When such divergence occurs, emotional reactions often drive behavior. The risk-as-feelings hypothesis is shown to explain a wide range of phenomena that have resisted interpretation in cognitive-consequentialist terms.

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Crossref · 10.1037/0033-2909.127.2.267

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224 of 224 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Much evidence demonstrates the significant role of affect in human judgment.

    “Much evidence demonstrates the significant role of affect in human judgment (Lerner et al., 2015; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2007).”

    From Everyone I Don’t Like Is Biased: Affective Evaluations and the Bias Blind Spot (2026) · cites this paper as Loewenstein et al., 2001

  • Under the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, affective responses to vivid outcome representations drive decision behavior by increasing motivational engagement.

    “Under the alternative risk-as-feelings hypothesis (Loewenstein et al. 2001;Slovic et al. 2004), affective responses to vivid outcome representations drive decision behavior by increasing motivational engagement.”

    From Limits of Interventions in AI-Assisted Decision Making (2026) · cites this paper as Loewenstein et al. 2001

  • Under an attentional reframing account, consequence framing shifts the decision-maker's frame from responding to a recommendation to predicting an outcome, preserving independent judgment without requiring additional cognitive effort.

    “Under an attentional reframing account, consequence framing shifts the decision-maker's frame from responding to a recommendation to predicting an outcome, preserving independent judgment without requiring additional cognitive effort (Loewenstein et al. 2001;Lerner and Keltner 2001).”

    From Limits of Interventions in AI-Assisted Decision Making (2026) · cites this paper as Loewenstein et al. 2001

  • Participants in our study anticipated their responses to gains and losses and chose accordingly.

    “Just as recent work demonstrating that individuals' anticipation of loss may shift their choices (38), it appears that participants in our study similarly anticipated their responses to gains and losses and chose accordingly (39).”

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Authors
Loewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Welch, N.
Affiliations
Carnegie Mellon University (US)
Venue
Psychological Bulletin
Published
2001
Volume
127
Issue
2
Pages
267-286
ISSN
  • 0033-2909 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1455
OpenAlex
W3124896223
Cited by
5,955
References
224
Citations by year
2026: 287 · 2025: 261 · 2024: 276 · 2023: 260 · 2022: 330 · 2021: 393 · 2020: 316 · 2019: 313 · 2018: 264 · 2017: 257 · 2016: 265 · 2015: 283 · 2014: 303 · 2013: 277 · 2012: 304
FWCI
56.31
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Psychological Bulletin (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Risk Perception and Management
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Leadership, Behavior, and Decision-Making Studies
Keywords
risk perception, decision making under risk, uncertainty, emotional decision-making
MeSH terms
Cognition, Decision Making, Emotions, Humans, Models, Psychological, Risk-Taking

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