The DOI matches its Crossref record; 48 of the 48 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Concentrated Control, Analyst Following, and Valuation: Do Analysts Matter Most When Investors Are Protected Least?
Open accessAbstract
This paper uses a sample of more than 2,500 firms from 27 countries to investigate the relation among ownership structure, analyst following, investor protection, and valuation. We find that analysts are less likely to follow firms with potential incentives to withhold or manipulate information, such as when the family/management group is the largest control rights blockholder. Furthermore, this relation is stronger for firms from low‐shareholder‐protection countries. Using valuation regressions that take into account potential endogeneity between analyst following and firm value, we find a positive valuation effect when analysts cover firms that have both potentially poor internal governance and weak country‐level external governance. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate governance plays an important role in analysts' willingness to follow firms and that increased analyst following is associated with higher valuations, particularly for firms likely to face governance problems.
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Cites
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Cited by
The financial reporting environment: Review of the recent literature
Beyer, A., Cohen, D. A., Lys, T. Z., & Walther, B. R. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.003 · Cited by 2,609
On the use of instrumental variables in accounting research
Larcker, D. F., & Rusticus, T. O. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.11.004 · Cited by 2,408
Mandatory IFRS Reporting around the World: Early Evidence on the Economic Consequences
DASKE, H., HAIL, L., LEUZ, C., & VERDI, R. (2008) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2008.00306.x · Cited by 2,165
Corporate Governance in Asia: A Survey
Claessens, S., & Fan, J. P. H. (2002) · International Review of Finance · doi:10.1111/1468-2443.00034 · Cited by 959
Stock price synchronicity and analyst coverage in emerging markets
Chan, K., & Hameed, A. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.03.010 · Cited by 830
Metadata
- Authors
- Lang, M. H., Lins, K. V., & Miller, D. P.
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2004-04-29
- Volume
- 42
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 589-623
- ISSN
- 0021-8456 (ISSN-L)
- 1475-679X
- OpenAlex
- W3121279693
- Cited by
- 636
- References
- 48
- FWCI
- 99.11
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Lang, M. H., Lins, K. V., & Miller, D. P. (2004). Concentrated Control, Analyst Following, and Valuation: Do Analysts Matter Most When Investors Are Protected Least? Journal of Accounting Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679x.2004.t01-1-00142.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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