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Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities
Abstract
This study examines whether Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity‐based holdings and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports. While several prior studies have examined this important question, the empirical evidence is mixed and the existence of a link between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities remains an open question. Because inferences from prior studies may be confounded by assumptions inherent in research design choices, we use propensity‐score matching and assess hidden (omitted variable) bias within a broader sample. In contrast to most prior research, we do not find evidence of a positive association between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities after matching CEOs on the observable characteristics of their contracting environments. Instead, we find some evidence that accounting irregularities occur less frequently at firms where CEOs have relatively higher levels of equity incentives.
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Cited by
A review of archival auditing research
DeFond, M., & Zhang, J. (2014) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.09.002 · Cited by 3,188
The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting
Armstrong, C. S., Guay, W. R., & Weber, J. P. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.001 · Cited by 1,494
Self-citationEarnings quality: Evidence from the field
Dichev, I. D., Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2013) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.05.004 · Cited by 1,103
The incentives for tax planning
Armstrong, C. S., Blouin, J. L., & Larcker, D. F. (2012) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.04.001 · Cited by 851
Self-citationThe Value of Financial Statement Verification in Debt Financing: Evidence from Private U.S. Firms
MINNIS, M. (2011) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-679x.2011.00411.x · Cited by 616
Metadata
- Authors
- ARMSTRONG, C. S., JAGOLINZER, A. D., & LARCKER, D. F.
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-03-16
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 225-271
- ISSN
- 0021-8456 (ISSN-L)
- 1475-679X
- OpenAlex
- W2021651037
- Cited by
- 875
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 162.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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