The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The incentives for tax planning
Open accessAbstract
We use a proprietary data set with detailed executive compensation information to examine the relationship between the incentives of the tax director and GAAP and cash effective tax rates, the book-tax gap, and measures of tax aggressiveness. We find that the incentive compensation of the tax director exhibits a strong negative relationship with the GAAP effective tax rate, but little relationship with the other tax attributes. We interpret these results as indicating that tax directors are provided with incentives to reduce the level of tax expense reported in the financial statements.
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Cites
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Self-citationOver-investment of free cash flow
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Hanlon, M., & Heitzman, S. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.09.002 · Cited by 2,888
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Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives
Desai, M. A., & Dharmapala, D. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.02.002 · Cited by 2,170
Long-Run Corporate Tax Avoidance
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The importance of the internal information environment for tax avoidance
Gallemore, J., & Labro, E. (2015) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.09.005 · Cited by 575
Customer–supplier relationships and corporate tax avoidance
Cen, L., Maydew, E. L., Zhang, L., & Zuo, L. (2017) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.09.009 · Cited by 438
Do Publicly Disclosed Tax Reserves Tell Us About Privately Disclosed Tax Shelter Activity?
LISOWSKY, P., ROBINSON, L., & SCHMIDT, A. (2013) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/joar.12003 · Cited by 396
Dual Class Ownership and Tax Avoidance
McGuire, S. T., Wang, D., & Wilson, R. J. (2011) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1761994 · Cited by 341
Predicting tax avoidance by means of social network analytics
Lismont, J., Cardinaels, E., Bruynseels, L., De Groote, S., Baesens, B., Lemahieu, W., & Vanthienen, J. (2018) · Decision Support Systems · doi:10.1016/j.dss.2018.02.001 · Cited by 51
Metadata
- Authors
- Armstrong, C. S., Blouin, J. L., & Larcker, D. F.
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2012-02
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 1-2
- Pages
- 391-411
- ISSN
- 0165-4101 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2152653626
- Cited by
- 851
- References
- 53
- FWCI
- 132.71
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
