ANTITAKEOVER CHARTER AMENDMENTS: EFFECTS ON CORPORATE DECISIONS
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In recent years many shareholders have voted to amend their corporate charters to decrease the likelihood of a hostile takeover. Critics of antitakeover amendments argue that by sheltering management from the market for corporate control, management may become entrenched and be less likely to act in the best interest of shareholders. The counter argument holds that the threat of a hostile takeover and possible job loss may move management toward “short‐sighted” decision making. In this study we test the hypothesis that, upon passage of antitakover amendments, managers adopt a longer‐term view with respect to capital expenditures and research and development. Empirical results support the hypothesis, as both capital expenditures and research development display significant increases relative to the year of enactment.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P. A., Ishii, J. L., & Metrick, A. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.278920 · Cited by 703
The Impact of Antitakeover Amendments on Corporate Financial Performance
Johnson, M. S., & Rao, R. P. (1997) · Financial Review · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6288.1997.tb00905.x · Cited by 57
The Case against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers
Bebchuk, L. A. (2002) · The University of Chicago Law Review · doi:10.2307/1600639 · Cited by 42
Metadata
- Authors
- Pugh, W. N., Page, D. E., & Jahera, J. S.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1992-03
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 57-67
- ISSN
- 0270-2592 (ISSN-L)
- 1475-6803
- OpenAlex
- W2127731095
- Cited by
- 58
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 9.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: ANTITAKEOVER CHARTER AMENDMENTS: EFFECTS ON CORPORATE DECISIONS. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1475-6803.1992.tb00786.x
- The paper
- Pugh, W. N., Page, D. E., & Jahera, J. S. (1992). ANTITAKEOVER CHARTER AMENDMENTS: EFFECTS ON CORPORATE DECISIONS. Journal of Financial Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6803.1992.tb00786.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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