USING DIVIDEND POLICY AND MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP TO REDUCE AGENCY COSTS
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this study we examine dividends and chief executive officer (CEO) stock ownership as interrelated mechanisms that may be used to reduce agency costs. We find a significant nonmonotonic relation between dividend yield and CEO stock ownership. Our evidence shows that until the CEO becomes entrenched, increased executive stock ownership reduces agency costs and decreases dividend yield. Beyond that point, increased stock ownership increases dividend yield. Whether additional stock ownership can reduce agency costs depends upon the CEO's degree of control in the firm.
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Citations
Cites
Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares
Miller, M. H., & Modigliani, F. (1961) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/294442 · Cited by 6,558
The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive‐Signalling Approach,
Ross, S. A. (1977) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003485 · Cited by 4,168
Cited by
Corporate governance, accounting and finance: A review
Brown, P., Beekes, W., & Verhoeven, P. (2011) · Accounting & Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1467-629x.2010.00385.x · Cited by 614
Farinha, J. (2003) · Journal of Business Finance & Accounting · doi:10.1111/j.0306-686x.2003.05624.x · Cited by 355
Ineffective corporate governance: Director busyness and board committee memberships
Jiraporn, P., Singh, M., & Lee, C. I. (2009) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.09.020 · Cited by 285
Metadata
- Authors
- Schooley, D. K., & Barney, L. D.
- Venue
- Journal of Financial Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1994-09
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 363-373
- ISSN
- 0270-2592 (ISSN-L)
- 1475-6803
- OpenAlex
- W2093320374
- Cited by
- 172
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 2.53
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: USING DIVIDEND POLICY AND MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP TO REDUCE AGENCY COSTS. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1475-6803.1994.tb00198.x
- The paper
- Schooley, D. K., & Barney, L. D. (1994). USING DIVIDEND POLICY AND MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP TO REDUCE AGENCY COSTS. Journal of Financial Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6803.1994.tb00198.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.