The DOI matches its Crossref record; 47 of the 47 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Dividend Policy, Corporate Governance and the Managerial Entrenchment Hypothesis: An Empirical Analysis
Open accessAbstract
This paper analyses the agency explanation for the cross‐sectional variation of corporate dividend policy in the UK by looking at the managerial entrenchment hypothesis drawn from the agency literature. Consistent with predictions, a significant U‐shaped relationship between dividend payout ratios and insider ownership is observed for a large (exceeding 600 firms) sample of UK companies and two distinct periods. These results strongly suggest the possibility of managerial entrenchment when insider ownership reaches a threshold of around 30%. Evidence is also presented that non‐beneficial holdings by insiders can lead to entrenchment in conjunction with shares held beneficially.
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Cites
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A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity
White, H. (1980) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912934 · Cited by 25,861
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1986) · Cited by 17,275
The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment
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Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Fama, E. F. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260866 · Cited by 10,466
Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1996) · Corporate Bankruptcy · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609435.005 · Cited by 9,306
The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment
Terra, P. R. (2008) · Revista de Administração e Contabilidade da Unisinos · doi:10.4013/base.20082.07 · Cited by 8,615
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
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Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
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Cited by
Corporate governance, accounting and finance: A review
Brown, P., Beekes, W., & Verhoeven, P. (2011) · Accounting & Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1467-629x.2010.00385.x · Cited by 614
Managerial Entrenchment and Corporate Social Performance
Surroca, J., & Tribó, J. A. (2008) · Journal of Business Finance & Accounting · doi:10.1111/j.1468-5957.2008.02090.x · Cited by 410
Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy: Shareholders’ Protection or Expropriation?
Adjaoud, F., & Ben‐Amar, W. (2010) · Journal of Business Finance & Accounting · doi:10.1111/j.1468-5957.2010.02192.x · Cited by 323
Metadata
- Authors
- Farinha, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2003-12
- Volume
- 30
- Issue
- 9-10
- Pages
- 1173-1209
- ISSN
- 0306-686X (ISSN-L)
- 1468-5957
- OpenAlex
- W3123446305
- Cited by
- 355
- References
- 47
- FWCI
- 22.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Farinha, J. (2003). Dividend Policy, Corporate Governance and the Managerial Entrenchment Hypothesis: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0306-686x.2003.05624.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.