The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements
Abstract
The ultimate litmus test of compliance theories occurs in situations where states' interests are directly opposed, such as competing interstate claims over territory, maritime areas, and cross‐border rivers. This article considers the extent to which the involvement of international institutions in the settlement of contentious issues between states bolsters compliance with agreements that are struck. Institutions may influence the prospects for compliance actively and passively. Active institutional involvement in the conflict management process increases the chances for compliance with agreements, particularly for binding institutional activities, relative to the active involvement of noninstitutional third parties. More passively, joint membership in peace‐promoting institutions enhances the likelihood that states will comply with peaceful agreements to resolve contentious issues. Empirical analyses demonstrate the relevance of international institutions for resolving contentious interstate issues both actively and passively, although the results suggest that institutions are more effective conflict managers when they choose binding settlement techniques.
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Cites
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Cited by
Life, Death, or Zombie? The Vitality of International Organizations
Gray, J. (2018) · International Studies Quarterly · doi:10.1093/isq/sqx086 · Cited by 338
Treaty Compliance and Violation
Simmons, B. (2010) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.12.040907.132713 · Cited by 291
China in a World of Orders: Rethinking Compliance and Challenge in Beijing's International Relations
Johnston, A. I. (2019) · International Security · doi:10.1162/isec_a_00360 · Cited by 273
Metadata
- Authors
- McLaughlin Mitchell, S., & Hensel, P. R.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2007-10
- Volume
- 51
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 721-737
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5907
- OpenAlex
- W2145471384
- Cited by
- 283
- References
- 53
- FWCI
- 66.85
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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