The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Lobbying and Taxes
Open accessAbstract
Lobbying dominates corporate political spending, but comprehensive studies of the benefits accrued are scarce. Using a dataset of all U.S. firms with publicly available financial statements, we delve into the tax benefits obtained from lobbying. Firms that spend more on lobbying in a given year pay lower effective tax rates in the next year. Increasing registered lobbying expenditures by 1% appears to lower effective tax rates by somewhere in the range of 0.5 to 1.6 percentage points for the average firm that lobbies. While individual firms amass considerable benefits, the costs of lobbying‐induced tax breaks appear modest for the government.
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Citations
Cites
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Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?
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Shackelford, D. A., & Shevlin, T. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00022-2 · Cited by 951
Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees
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Cited by
Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying
de Figueiredo, J. M., & Richter, B. K. (2014) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-100711-135308 · Cited by 367
Self-citationDeterminants and Effects of Corporate Lobbying
Hill, M. D., Kelly, G. W., Lockhart, G. B., & Van Ness, R. A. (2013) · Financial Management · doi:10.1111/fima.12032 · Cited by 266
Bonica, A. (2016) · Business and Politics · doi:10.1515/bap-2016-0004 · Cited by 147
Grose, C. R., Lopez, P., Sadhwani, S., & Yoshinaka, A. (2022) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1086/714923 · Cited by 39
LI, Z., & DISALVO, R. W. (2023) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305542200096x · Cited by 26
Metadata
- Authors
- Richter, B. K., Samphantharak, K., & Timmons, J. F.
- Venue
- American Journal of Political Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2009-09-18
- Volume
- 53
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 893-909
- ISSN
- 0092-5853 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-5907
- OpenAlex
- W3124931107
- Cited by
- 406
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 35.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
