The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
On the Positive Role of Financial Intermediation in Allocation of Venture Capital in a Market with Imperfect Information
Abstract
This paper develops a theory of financial intermediation that highlights the contribution of intermediaries as informed agents in a market with imperfect information. We consider a venture capital market where the entrepreneurs select the qualities of projects and their perquisite consumptions, about which the investors are imperfectly informed. It is shown that when all investors have positive search costs, the entrepreneurs are induced to offer the unacceptable inferior projects (“lemons” only), and the investors will not enter the venture capital market, but put their funds in other low return investments–an undesirable allocation of resources. Beginning with an initial undesirable situation, the financial intermediaries may evolve as informed agents that induce a Pareto‐preferred allocation, leading the investors to a higher welfare state. We focus our analysis on the existence of intermediation equilibra when the market for intermediation services is competitive. The distribution of returns on projects, the fees charged by intermediaries, and the fraction of institutional holdings are all endogenous in equilibrium. It is shown that (i) there cannot be a competitive intermediation equilibrium with very high institutional holdings, and (ii) in other cases multiple equilibra may exist, but the one with the highest institutional holdings dominates the others in a Pareto sense.
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Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
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The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
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Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
Diamond, D. W., & Dybvig, P. H. (1983) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261155 · Cited by 9,369
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
Brealey, R., Leland, H. E., & Pyle, D. H. (1977) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03277.x · Cited by 4,055
Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation
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Cited by
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital
GOMPERS, P. A. (1995) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb05185.x · Cited by 2,053
The Venture Capital Revolution
Gompers, P., & Lerner, J. (2001) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.2.145 · Cited by 1,934
The Financing of R&D and Innovation
Hall, B. H., & Lerner, J. (2010) · Handbook of the Economics of Innovation · doi:10.1016/s0169-7218(10)01014-2 · Cited by 1,711
Baum, J. A. C., & Silverman, B. S. (2004) · Journal of Business Venturing · doi:10.1016/s0883-9026(03)00038-7 · Cited by 1,418
Metadata
- Authors
- CHAN, Y.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1983-12
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1543-1568
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2096686146
- Cited by
- 359
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 12.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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