The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Collateral and Competitive Equilibria with Moral Hazard and Private Information
Abstract
The authors examine equilibrium credit contracts and allocations under different competitivity specifications and explain the economic roles of collateral under these specifications. Both moral hazard and adverse selection are considered. The principal message is that how a competitive equilibrium is conceptualized significantly affects the characterization of equilibrium credit contracts. Specifically, some well‐known results in the rationing literature are shown to rest delicately on the adopted equilibrium concept. Two somewhat surprising results emerge. First, high‐quality borrowers with unlimited collateral may be priced out of the market despite the bank having idle deposits. Second, high‐quality borrowers may put up more collateral.
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Citations
Cites
Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d8v12ft1 · Cited by 12,769
Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information
Rothschild, M., & Stiglitz, J. (1976) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885326 · Cited by 4,987
The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive‐Signalling Approach,
Ross, S. A. (1977) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003485 · Cited by 4,168
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1983) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912246 · Cited by 2,095
Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
Myerson, R. B. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912346 · Cited by 1,983
Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing
Jaffee, D. M., & Russell, T. (1976) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1885327 · Cited by 1,411
Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
Harris, M., & Raviv, A. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90073-5 · Cited by 942
Incentive Effects of Terminations: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1983) · Columbia University · doi:10.7916/d80k2kjv · Cited by 549
Asymmetric Valuations and the Role of Collateral in Loan Agreements
Chan, Y.-S., & Kanatas, G. (1985) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.2307/1992508 · Cited by 473
Self-citationCompetitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information
Besanko, D., & Thakor, A. V. (1987) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(87)90108-6 · Cited by 361
Self-citation
Cited by
Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?
Boot, A. W. A. (2000) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1006/jfin.2000.0282 · Cited by 2,354
SHARPE, S. A. (1990) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb02427.x · Cited by 2,324
FinTech and banking: What do we know?
Thakor, A. V. (2020) · Journal of Financial Intermediation · doi:10.1016/j.jfi.2019.100833 · Cited by 1,378
Self-citationCollateral, loan quality and bank risk
Berger, A. N., & Udell, G. F. (1990) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(90)90042-3 · Cited by 1,013
Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists
ADMATI, A. R., & PFLEIDERER, P. (1994) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb05146.x · Cited by 723
Metadata
- Authors
- CHAN, Y., & THAKOR, A. V.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1987-06
- Volume
- 42
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 345-363
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2114682541
- Cited by
- 329
- References
- 13
- FWCI
- 13.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.