The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
An Empirical Test of the Impact of Managerial Self‐Interest on Corporate Capital Structure
Abstract
This paper provides a test of whether capital structure decisions are at least in part motivated by managerial self‐interest. It is shown that the debt ratio is negatively related to management's shareholding, reflecting the greater nondiversifiable risk of debt to management than to public investors for maintaining a low debt ratio. Unless there is a nonmanagerial principal stockholder, no substantial increase of debt can be realized, which may suggest that the existence of large nonmanagerial stockholders might make the interests of managers and public investors coincide.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0 · Cited by 18,957
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1986) · Cited by 17,275
Determinants of corporate borrowing
Myers, S. C. (1977) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(77)90015-0 · Cited by 13,169
Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1996) · Corporate Bankruptcy · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609435.005 · Cited by 9,306
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261385 · Cited by 8,408
MYERS, S. C. (1984) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03646.x · Cited by 7,526
Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have
Myers, S., & Majluf, N. (1984) · doi:10.3386/w1396 · Cited by 6,745
Myers, S. C. (1984) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2327916 · Cited by 3,141
Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends
Easterbrook, F. H. (1984) · eYLS (Yale Law School) · Cited by 3,065
Cited by
The Theory of Capital Structure
HARRIS, M., & RAVIV, A. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb03753.x · Cited by 4,347
Optimal Investment, Monitoring, and the Staging of Venture Capital
GOMPERS, P. A. (1995) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb05185.x · Cited by 2,053
The Financing of R&D and Innovation
Hall, B. H., & Lerner, J. (2010) · Handbook of the Economics of Innovation · doi:10.1016/s0169-7218(10)01014-2 · Cited by 1,711
Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions
BERGER, P. G., OFEK, E., & YERMACK, D. L. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb01115.x · Cited by 1,534
Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders
Gilson, S. C. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90060-d · Cited by 1,083
Metadata
- Authors
- FRIEND, I., & LANG, L. H. P.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1988-06
- Volume
- 43
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 271-281
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2109360003
- Cited by
- 1,080
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 23.39
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: An Empirical Test of the Impact of Managerial Self‐Interest on Corporate Capital Structure. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb03938.x
- The paper
- FRIEND, I., & LANG, L. H. P. (1988). An Empirical Test of the Impact of Managerial Self‐Interest on Corporate Capital Structure. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb03938.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.