The DOI matches its Crossref record; 24 of the 24 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Market Discounts and Shareholder Gains for Placing Equity Privately
Abstract
Despite selling at substantial discounts, private placements of equity are associated with positive abnormal returns. We find evidence that discounts reflect information costs borne by private investors and abnormal returns reflect favorable information about firm value. Results are consistent with the role of private placements as a solution to the Myers and Majluf underinvestment problem and with the use of private placements to signal undervaluation. We also find some evidence of anticipated monitoring benefits from private sales of equity. For the smaller firms that comprise our sample, information effects appear to be relatively more important than ownership effects.
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Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
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A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and a direct test for heteroskedasticity
White, H. (1980) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912934 · Cited by 25,861
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0 · Cited by 18,957
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
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Management ownership and market valuation
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Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have InformationThat Investors Do Not Have
Myers, S., & Majluf, N. (1984) · doi:10.3386/w1396 · Cited by 6,745
The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences
Demsetz, H., & Lehn, K. (1985) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261354 · Cited by 6,236
INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
Brealey, R., Leland, H. E., & Pyle, D. H. (1977) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03277.x · Cited by 4,055
Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation
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Firm size and the gains from acquisitions
Moeller, S. B., Schlingemann, F. P., & Stulz, R. M. (2004) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2003.07.002 · Cited by 2,322
Hovakimian, A., Opler, T., & Titman, S. (2001) · The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.2307/2676195 · Cited by 1,742
Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm
Burkart, M., Gromb, D., & Panunzi, F. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355397555325 · Cited by 1,509
Tunneling, propping, and expropriation: evidence from connected party transactions in Hong Kong☆
CHEUNG, Y., RAU, P., & STOURAITIS, A. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.08.012 · Cited by 941
Uncertainty, Financial Frictions, and Investment Dynamics
Gilchrist, S., Sim, J., & Zakrajšek, E. (2014) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w20038 · Cited by 828
Metadata
- Authors
- HERTZEL, M., & SMITH, R. L.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1993-06
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 459-485
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2118519536
- Cited by
- 661
- References
- 24
- FWCI
- 16.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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