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Cited by 1,509

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm

Burkart, M., Gromb, D., Panunzi, F.·1997·The Quarterly Journal of Economics
DOI 10.1162/003355397555325
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Abstract

We propose that dispersed outside ownership and the resulting managerial discretion come with costs but also with benefits. Even when tight control by shareholders is ex post efficient, it constitutes ex ante an expropriation threat that reduces managerial initiative and noncontractible investments. In addition, we show that equity implements state contingent control, a feature usually associated with debt. Finally, we demonstrate that monitoring, and hence ownership concentration, may conflict with performance-based incentive schemes.

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Citations

Cites

Show all 3 references

Research works printed but not linked: 25

  1. 10.1086/261965 · DOI · Paper page
  2. Aghion Philippe, 1992, Review of Economic Studies, 473, 10.2307/2297860 · DOI · Paper page
  3. 10.1086/262063 · DOI · Paper page
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  5. Brennan, Michael, and Julian Franks, "Underpricing, Ownership and Control in Initial Public Offerings of Equity Securities in the U. K." mimeo, London Business School, 1996. · DOI · Paper page
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  8. Demsetz Harold, 1985, Journal of Political Economy, 1155, 10.1086/261354 · DOI · Paper page
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  10. Grossman Sanford, 1986, Journal of Political Economy, 691, 10.1086/261404 · DOI · Paper page
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  12. 10.2307/2328908 · doi:10.2307/2328908
  13. Jensen Michael, 1986, American Economic Review, 323
  14. Jensen Michael, 1990, Journal of Political Economy, 5
  15. La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, "Law and Finance," mimeo, Harvard University, 1996. · DOI
  16. 10.1016/0304-405X(88)90048-7 · DOI · Paper page
  17. Rajan Raghuram, 1992, Journal of Finance, 1121
  18. 10.1016/0304-405X(90)90019-V · DOI · Paper page
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  20. Servaes Henri, 1994, Finanzmarkt und Portfoliomanagement, 184
  21. Shleifer, Andrei, and Lawrence Summers, "Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers," in Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, A. Auerbach, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). · DOI
  22. Shleifer Andrei, 1986, Journal of Political Economy, 461, 10.1086/261385 · DOI · Paper page
  23. 10.1016/0304-405X(89)90003-2 · DOI · Paper page
  24. Yafeh Yishay, 1995, CEPR DP No., 1178
  25. Zwiebel Jeffrey, 1995, Review of Economic Studies, 161, 10.2307/2297801 · DOI · Paper page

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Metadata

Authors
Burkart, M., Gromb, D., & Panunzi, F.
Venue
The Quarterly Journal of Economics
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
1997-08-01
Volume
112
Issue
3
Pages
693-728
ISSN
  • 0033-5533 (ISSN-L)
  • 1531-4650
DOI
10.1162/003355397555325
OpenAlex
W2005998587
Cited by
1,509
References
3
FWCI
140.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1162/003355397555325
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Burkart, M., Gromb, D., & Panunzi, F. (1997). Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555325

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.