The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Limitation of Liability and the Ownership Structure of the Firm
Abstract
This paper models the optimal choice of shareholder liability. If investors want managers to be monitored, the monitors should be residual claimants (shareholders), and monitoring and firm value will increase as shareholders commit more of their wealth to the firm. When liquidating wealth is costly, contingent liability dominates direct investment as a wealth commitment device; however, if wealth is unobservable, under this regime only relatively poor investors will hold shares in equilibrium. This may be prevented at a cost by verifying shareholder wealth and restricting stock transfers. Comparative statics on various liability regimes are used to motivate actual contractual arrangements.
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Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
Cited by
Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors
McCAHERY, J. A., SAUTNER, Z., & STARKS, L. T. (2016) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12393 · Cited by 1,494
Double Liability and Bank Risk Taking
Grossman, R. S. (2001) · Journal of Money, Credit and Banking · doi:10.2307/2673878 · Cited by 117
Metadata
- Authors
- WINTON, A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1993-06
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 487-512
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2151794806
- Cited by
- 193
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 6.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- WINTON, A. (1993). Limitation of Liability and the Ownership Structure of the Firm. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04724.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.