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Cited by 339

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 35 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Board Seat Accumulation by Executives: A Shareholder's Perspective

PERRY, TOD, PEYER, URS · 2005 · The Journal of Finance

Abstract

While reformers have argued that multiple directorships for executives can destroy value, we investigate firms with executives that accept an outside directorship and find negative announcement returns only when the executive's firm has greater agency problems. When fewer agency concerns exist, additional directorships relate to increased firm value. Announcement returns are also higher when executives accept an outside directorship in a financial, high‐growth, or related‐industry firm. Our results suggest that outside directorships for executives can enhance firm value, which has important implications for firms employing executives nominated for outside boards and for policy recommendations restricting the number of directorships.

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00788.x

Cites

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Metadata

Authors
PERRY, T., & PEYER, U.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2005-08
Volume
60
Issue
4
Pages
2083-2123
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
OpenAlex
W2143513521
Cited by
339
References
35
FWCI
38.84
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Board Seat Accumulation by Executives: A Shareholder's Perspective. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00788.x
The paper
PERRY, T., & PEYER, U. (2005). Board Seat Accumulation by Executives: A Shareholder's Perspective. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00788.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.