The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Information Control, Career Concerns, and Corporate Governance
Open accessAbstract
We examine corporate governance effectiveness when the CEO generates project ideas and the board of directors screens these ideas for approval. However, the precision of the board's screening information is controlled by the CEO. Moreover, both the CEO and the board have career concerns that interact. The board's career concerns cause it to distort its investment recommendation procyclically, whereas the CEO's career concerns cause her to sometimes reduce the precision of the board's information. Moreover, the CEO sometimes prefers a less able board, and this happens only during economic upturns, suggesting that corporate governance will be weaker during economic upturns.
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Cites
Coase, R. H. (1937) · Economica · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.x · Cited by 23,972
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243 · cited 3×
“…these as the most basic problems of corporate governance, and our analysis is not intended to add anything to the existing literature about how these problems should be resolved using incentive contracts, monitoring, and the appropriate carrots and sticks (see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).”
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338 · cited 1×
“It is this proclivity to influence ability perceptions through action choices that we view as the essence of career concerns, in a manner consistent with the recent literature (e.g., Prendergast and Stole (1996), Prendergast (1999), Milbourn, Shockley, and Thakor (2001)).”
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Cited by
ADAMS, R. B., & FERREIRA, D. (2007) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01206.x · Cited by 2,401
The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey
Adams, R. B., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.1.58 · Cited by 2,358
The impact of environmental, social, and governance disclosure on firm value: The role of CEO power
Li, Y., Gong, M., Zhang, X.-Y., & Koh, L. (2018) · The British Accounting Review · doi:10.1016/j.bar.2017.09.007 · Cited by 1,139
Overconfidence, CEO Selection, and Corporate Governance
GOEL, A. M., & THAKOR, A. V. (2008) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01412.x · Cited by 826
Self-citationThe costs of intense board monitoring
Faleye, O., Hoitash, R., & Hoitash, U. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010 · Cited by 814
Metadata
- Authors
- SONG, F., & THAKOR, A. V.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2006-08
- Volume
- 61
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1845-1896
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3123681137
- Cited by
- 229
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 33.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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