The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Why Do Firms Become Widely Held? An Analysis of the Dynamics of Corporate Ownership
Open accessAbstract
We examine the evolution of insider ownership of IPO firms from 1970 to 2001 to understand how U.S. firms become widely held. A majority of these firms has insider ownership below 20% after 10 years. Stock market performance and liquidity play an extremely important role in ownership dynamics. Firms with stocks that are highly valued, are liquid, and have performed well experience large decreases in insider ownership and become widely held. Ownership also falls for low cash flow and high capital expenditures firms. Surprisingly, variables proxying for agency costs have limited success in explaining the evolution of insider ownership.
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Citations
Cites
Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(84)90023-0 · Cited by 18,957
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Determinants of corporate borrowing
Myers, S. C. (1977) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(77)90015-0 · Cited by 13,169
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
Self-citation
Cited by
The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States
Holderness, C. G. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhm069 · Cited by 656
Bidding strategies and takeover premiums: A review
Eckbo, B. E. (2009) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2008.09.016 · Cited by 306
The internal capital markets of business groups: Evidence from intra-group loans
Buchuk, D., Larrain, B., Muñoz, F., & Urzúa I., F. (2014) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.01.003 · Cited by 292
The Life Cycle of Family Ownership: International Evidence
Franks, J., Mayer, C., Volpin, P., & Wagner, H. F. (2012) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhr135 · Cited by 263
Metadata
- Authors
- HELWEGE, J., PIRINSKY, C., & STULZ, R. M.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2007-05-08
- Volume
- 62
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 995-1028
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3022378855
- Cited by
- 214
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 59.84
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- HELWEGE, J., PIRINSKY, C., & STULZ, R. M. (2007). Why Do Firms Become Widely Held? An Analysis of the Dynamics of Corporate Ownership. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01229.x
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.