The DOI matches its Crossref record; 36 of the 36 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Why Are Buyouts Levered? The Financial Structure of Private Equity Funds
Abstract
Private equity funds are important to the economy, yet there is little analysis explaining their financial structure. In our model the financial structure minimizes agency conflicts between fund managers and investors. Relative to financing each deal separately, raising a fund where the manager receives a fraction of aggregate excess returns reduces incentives to make bad investments. Efficiency is further improved by requiring funds to also use deal‐by‐deal debt financing, which becomes unavailable in states where internal discipline fails. Private equity investment becomes highly sensitive to aggregate credit conditions and investments in bad states outperform investments in good states.
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Cites
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Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
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Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1986) · Cited by 17,275
Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1996) · Corporate Bankruptcy · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609435.005 · Cited by 9,306
Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring
Diamond, D. W. (1984) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297430 · Cited by 8,476
CORPORATE INCOME TAXES AND THE COST OF CAPITAL: A CORRECTION
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Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
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The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations
Sahlman, W. A. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90065-8 · Cited by 2,609
Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence, and Capital Flows
KAPLAN, S. N., & SCHOAR, A. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00780.x · Cited by 1,946
Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources
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Cited by
The Economics of Private Equity Funds
Metrick, A., & Yasuda, A. (2010) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhq020 · Cited by 660
Corporate Governance and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity
Acharya, V. V., Gottschalg, O. F., Hahn, M., & Kehoe, C. (2013) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhs117 · Cited by 393
Incentives to Innovate and the Decision to Go Public or Private
Ferreira, D., Manso, G., & Silva, A. C. (2014) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhs070 · Cited by 386
Borrow Cheap, Buy High? The Determinants of Leverage and Pricing in Buyouts
AXELSON, U., JENKINSON, T., STRÖMBERG, P., & WEISBACH, M. S. (2013) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12082 · Cited by 381
Self-citationThe role of private equity group reputation in LBO financing
Demiroglu, C., & James, C. M. (2010) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.02.001 · Cited by 265
Metadata
- Authors
- AXELSON, U., STRÖMBERG, P., & WEISBACH, M. S.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2009-07-16
- Volume
- 64
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1549-1582
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3122362577
- Cited by
- 287
- References
- 36
- FWCI
- 88.54
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.