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Cited by 200

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Explicit versus Implicit Contracts: Evidence from CEO Employment Agreements

GILLAN, STUART L., HARTZELL, JAY C., PARRINO, ROBERT · 2009 · The Journal of Finance

Abstract

We report evidence on the determinants of whether the relationship between a firm and its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is governed by an explicit (written) or an implicit agreement. We find that fewer than half of the CEOs of S&P 500 firms have comprehensive explicit employment agreements. Consistent with contracting theory, explicit agreements are more likely to be observed and are likely to have a longer duration in situations in which the sustainability of the relationship is less certain and where the expected loss to the CEO is greater if the firm fails to honor the agreement.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01475.x

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Metadata

Authors
GILLAN, S. L., HARTZELL, J. C., & PARRINO, R.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2009-07-16
Volume
64
Issue
4
Pages
1629-1655
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
OpenAlex
W2117130207
Cited by
200
References
1
FWCI
44.27
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Explicit versus Implicit Contracts: Evidence from CEO Employment Agreements. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01475.x
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GILLAN, S. L., HARTZELL, J. C., & PARRINO, R. (2009). Explicit versus Implicit Contracts: Evidence from CEO Employment Agreements. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01475.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.