The DOI matches its Crossref record; 53 of the 53 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment
Abstract
We study the effects of noncompetition agreements by analyzing time-series and cross-sectional variation in the enforceability of these contracts across US states. We find that tougher noncompetition enforcement promotes executive stability. Increased enforceability also results in reduced executive compensation and shifts its form toward greater use of salary. We further show that stricter enforcement reduces capital expenditures per employee. These results are consistent with a model in which enforceable noncompetition contracts encourage firms to invest in their managers’ human capital. On the other hand, our findings suggest that these contracts also discourage managers from investing in their own human capital and that this second effect is empirically dominant.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250042 · Cited by 18,025
Corporate Ownership Around the World
La Porta, R., Lopez‐De‐Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00115 · Cited by 10,541
Legal Determinants of External Finance
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ‐DE‐SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02727.x · Cited by 9,783
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261404 · Cited by 9,352
Investor protection and corporate governance
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9 · Cited by 6,848
Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261729 · Cited by 5,364
Outside directors and CEO turnover
Weisbach, M. S. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0 · Cited by 4,234
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Lazear, E., & Rosen, S. (1979) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w0401 · Cited by 3,033
Initial human and financial capital as predictors of new venture performance
Cooper, A. C., Gimeno-Gascon, F. J., & Woo, C. Y. (1994) · Journal of Business Venturing · doi:10.1016/0883-9026(94)90013-2 · Cited by 2,297
Legal Determinants of External Finance
Porta, R. L., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.2307/2329518 · Cited by 2,031
Cited by
Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete Experiment
Marx, M., Strumsky, D., & Fleming, L. (2009) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1080.0985 · Cited by 698
Wrongful Discharge Laws and Innovation
Acharya, V. V., Baghai, R. P., & Subramanian, K. V. (2014) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hht009 · Cited by 579
Fallick, B., Fleischman, C. A., & Rebitzer, J. B. (2006) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest.88.3.472 · Cited by 494
Talent Management: Conceptual Approaches and Practical Challenges
Cappelli, P., & Keller, Jr. (2014) · Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior · doi:10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-031413-091314 · Cited by 484
Protection of trade secrets and capital structure decisions
Klasa, S., Ortiz-Molina, H., Serfling, M., & Srinivasan, S. (2018) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.02.008 · Cited by 448
Metadata
- Authors
- Garmaise, M. J.
- Venue
- Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2009-11-03
- Volume
- 27
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 376-425
- ISSN
- 1465-7341 (ISSN-L)
- 8756-6222
- OpenAlex
- W1990553479
- Cited by
- 542
- References
- 53
- FWCI
- 55.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/jleo/ewp033
- The paper
- Garmaise, M. J. (2011). Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewp033
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.