The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 37 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
How Has CEO Turnover Changed?
Abstract
We study CEO turnover – both internal (board driven) and external (through takeover and bankruptcy) – from 1992 to 2007 for a sample of large US companies. Annual CEO turnover is higher than that estimated in previous studies over earlier periods. Turnover is 15.8% from 1992 to 2007, implying an average tenure as CEO of less than 7 years. In the more recent period since 2000, total CEO turnover increases to 16.8%, implying an average tenure of less than 6 years. Internal turnover is significantly related to three components of firm stock performance – performance relative to industry, industry performance relative to the overall market, and the performance of the overall stock market. The relations are stronger in the more recent period since 2000. We find similar patterns for both forced and unforced turnover, suggesting that some, if not most, turnover labeled as unforced is actually not voluntary. The turnover‐performance sensitivity is modestly related to block shareholder ownership and board independence.
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Cites
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Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?
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Corporate governance and firm performance
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Cited by
Are Overconfident CEOs Better Innovators?
HIRSHLEIFER, D., LOW, A., & TEOH, S. H. (2012) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01753.x · Cited by 1,765
Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership
AZAR, J., SCHMALZ, M. C., & TECU, I. (2018) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12698 · Cited by 980
“The second stream of related literature concerns institutional investors’ involvement in corporate governance (e.g., Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Matvos and Ostrovsky, 2008; Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009; Harford, Jenter, and Li, 2011; Kaplan and Minton, 2012; Massa and Žaldokas, 2013; Katz…”
Executive compensation and corporate governance in China
Conyon, M. J., & He, L. (2011) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.04.006 · Cited by 592
Transparency and firm innovation
Zhong, R. (. (2018) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2018.02.001 · Cited by 375
Female directors, board committees and firm performance
Green, C. P., & Homroy, S. (2018) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.12.003 · Cited by 346
Metadata
- Authors
- Kaplan, S. N., & Minton, B. A.
- Venue
- International Review of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-09-05
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 57-87
- ISSN
- 1369-412X (ISSN-L)
- 1468-2443
- OpenAlex
- W1828771748
- Cited by
- 512
- References
- 37
- FWCI
- 129.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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