The DOI matches its Crossref record; 66 of the 66 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation
Open accessAbstract
We present evidence that reassigning tasks among agents can alleviate moral hazard in communication. A rotation policy that routinely reassigns loan officers to borrowers of a commercial bank affects the officers' reporting behavior. When an officer anticipates rotation, reports are more accurate and contain more bad news about the borrower's repayment prospects. As a result, the rotation policy makes bank lending decisions more sensitive to officer reports. The threat of rotation improves communication because self‐reporting bad news has a smaller negative effect on an officer's career prospects than bad news exposed by a successor.
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Cites
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The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business Data
PETERSEN, M. A., & RAJAN, R. G. (1994) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04418.x · Cited by 5,440
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INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
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Cited by
Endogeneity in Empirical Corporate Finance1
Roberts, M. R., & Whited, T. M. (2013) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/b978-0-44-453594-8.00007-0 · Cited by 2,459
Peer Pressure: Social Interaction and the Disposition Effect
Heimer, R. Z. (2016) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhw063 · Cited by 323
Bureaucracy and Service Delivery
Pepinsky, T. B., Pierskalla, J. H., & Sacks, A. (2017) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051215-022705 · Cited by 258
Do Relationships Matter? Evidence from Loan Officer Turnover
Drexler, A., & Schoar, A. (2014) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2014.1957 · Cited by 122
Fintech for the Poor: Financial Intermediation Without Discrimination
Tantri, P. (2021) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1093/rof/rfaa039 · Cited by 94
Metadata
- Authors
- HERTZBERG, A., LIBERTI, J. M., & PARAVISINI, D.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-05-07
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 795-828
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2108479175
- Cited by
- 287
- References
- 66
- FWCI
- 42.59
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.