The DOI matches its Crossref record; 61 of the 61 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Executive Compensation and the Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt
Open accessAbstract
Executive compensation influences managerial risk preferences through executives' portfolio sensitivities to changes in stock prices (delta) and stock return volatility (vega). Large deltas discourage managerial risk‐taking, while large vegas encourage risk‐taking. Theory suggests that short‐maturity debt mitigates agency costs of debt by constraining managerial risk preferences. We posit and find evidence of a negative (positive) relation between CEO portfolio deltas (vegas) and short‐maturity debt. We also find that short‐maturity debt mitigates the influence of vega‐ and delta‐related incentives on bond yields. Overall, our empirical evidence shows that short‐term debt mitigates agency costs of debt arising from compensation risk.
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Cites
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Cited by
Angrist, J. D., & Krueger, A. B. (2001) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.4.69 · Cited by 2,355
Refinancing Risk and Cash Holdings
HARFORD, J., KLASA, S., & MAXWELL, W. F. (2014) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12133 · Cited by 667
A Review of Empirical Capital Structure Research and Directions for the Future
Graham, J. R., & Leary, M. T. (2011) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-102710-144821 · Cited by 547
Why are US firms using more short-term debt?
Custódio, C., Ferreira, M. A., & Laureano, L. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.10.009 · Cited by 497
Field, E., Pande, R., Papp, J., & Rigol, N. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.6.2196 · Cited by 375
Metadata
- Authors
- BROCKMAN, P., MARTIN, X., & UNLU, E.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-05-07
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1123-1161
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2104810275
- Cited by
- 442
- References
- 61
- FWCI
- 70.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.