The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Leverage, Moral Hazard, and Liquidity
Abstract
Financial firms raise short‐term debt to finance asset purchases; this induces risk shifting when economic conditions worsen and limits their ability to roll over debt. Constrained firms de‐lever by selling assets to lower‐leverage firms. In turn, asset–market liquidity depends on the system‐wide distribution of leverage, which is itself endogenous to future economic prospects. Good economic prospects yield cheaper short‐term debt, inducing entry of higher‐leverage firms. Consequently, adverse asset shocks in good times lead to greater de‐leveraging and sudden drying up of market and funding liquidity.
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Citations
Cites
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Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
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Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach
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Corporate finance and corporate governance
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Cited by
A Macroeconomic Model with a Financial Sector
Brunnermeier, M. K., & Sannikov, Y. (2014) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.104.2.379 · Cited by 1,969
Margin-based Asset Pricing and Deviations from the Law of One Price
Gârleanu, N., & Pedersen, L. H. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhr027 · Cited by 649
Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk‐Taking Channel: Evidence from the United States
DELL'ARICCIA, G., LAEVEN, L., & SUAREZ, G. A. (2017) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12467 · Cited by 483
Real interest rates, leverage, and bank risk-taking
DellʼAriccia, G., Laeven, L., & Marquez, R. (2014) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/j.jet.2013.06.002 · Cited by 410
Market timing, investment, and risk management
Bolton, P., Chen, H., & Wang, N. (2013) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.006 · Cited by 410
Metadata
- Authors
- ACHARYA, V. V., & VISWANATHAN, S.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-01-06
- Volume
- 66
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 99-138
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3022900687
- Cited by
- 376
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 71.79
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.