The DOI matches its Crossref record; 56 of the 56 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Internal Governance of Firms
Open accessAbstract
We develop a model of internal governance where the self‐serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. Internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure that firms have substantial value, even with little or no external governance by investors. External governance, even if crude and uninformed, can complement internal governance and improve efficiency. This leads to a theory of investment and dividend policy, in which dividends are paid by self‐interested CEOs to maintain a balance between internal and external control.
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Cites
Separation of Ownership and Control
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467037 · Cited by 19,058
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1986) · Cited by 17,275
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
The theory of the growth of the firm
Penrose, E. (1996) · Long Range Planning · doi:10.1016/s0024-6301(96)90295-2 · Cited by 13,770
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
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The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. D. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261404 · Cited by 9,352
Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1996) · Corporate Bankruptcy · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609435.005 · Cited by 9,306
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
JENSEN, M. C. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x · Cited by 8,528
Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide Useful Measures of Financing Constraints?
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Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment
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Cited by
Dimson, E., Karakaş, O., & Li, X. (2015) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhv044 · Cited by 1,242
Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management
Cheng, Q., Lee, J., & Shevlin, T. (2016) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-51275 · Cited by 412
Acharya, V. V., Baghai, R. P., & Subramanian, K. V. (2013) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/674106 · Cited by 362
Self-citationCORPORATE TAX AVOIDANCE: A LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH AGENDA
Wang, F., Xu, S., Sun, J., & Cullinan, C. P. (2020) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/joes.12347 · Cited by 294
Divisional Managers and Internal Capital Markets
DUCHIN, R., & SOSYURA, D. (2013) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12003 · Cited by 267
Metadata
- Authors
- ACHARYA, V. V., MYERS, S. C., & RAJAN, R. G.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-05-23
- Volume
- 66
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 689-720
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3023547495
- Cited by
- 335
- References
- 56
- FWCI
- 76.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.