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Cited by 1,242Corporate Social Responsibility ReportingCorporate Finance and GovernanceFinancial Markets and Investment Strategies

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Dimson, Elroy, Karakaş, Oğuzhan, Li, Xi·2015·Review of Financial Studies
DOI 10.1093/rfs/hhv044
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Abstract

We analyze an extensive proprietary database of corporate social responsibility engagements with U.S. public companies from 1999–2009. Engagements address environmental, social, and governance concerns. Successful (unsuccessful) engagements are followed by positive (zero) abnormal returns. Companies with inferior governance and socially conscious institutional investors are more likely to be engaged. Success in engagements is more probable if the engaged firm has reputational concerns and higher capacity to implement changes. Collaboration among activists is instrumental in increasing the success rate of environmental/social engagements. After successful engagements, particularly on environmental/social issues, companies experience improved accounting performance and governance and increased institutional ownership.

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Crossref · 10.1093/rfs/hhv044

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93 of 93 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • These results are similar to the typical anatomy of engagement sequences analyzed in Dimson, Karakaş, and Li (2015), in which engagements most often start with discussions between management and shareholders and then potentially escalate.

    “These results are also similar to the typical anatomy of the engagement sequences analyzed in Dimson, Karakaş, and Li (2015), in which engagements most often start with discussions between management and shareholders and then potentially escalate depending on how the initial discussions are received.”

    From The Importance of Climate Risks for Institutional Investors (2020) · cites this paper as Dimson, Karakaş, and Li (2015)

    Section 2.1 (page unavailable) describes engagement sequences involving Raising Awareness—informing or warning target companies—and Requests for Change, a more stringent step. Section 3.3 (page unavailable) also characterizes Requests for Change as more aggressive. These passages support possible escalation, but they do not establish that engagements most often begin with management–shareholder discussions or that escalation depends on how those initial discussions are received. (LLM, conf=0.82)

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  • Dimson, Karakaş, and Li (2015) show that engagement on climate risks can enhance shareholder value.

    “Dimson, Karakaş, and Li (2015) show that engagement on climate risks can enhance shareholder value”

    From The Importance of Climate Risks for Institutional Investors (2020) · cites this paper as Dimson, Karakaş, and Li (2015)

  • Dimson et al. (2015) find that successful CSR campaigns by active owners are associated with positive stock returns and better accounting performance.

    “Dimson et al. (2015) find that successful CSR campaigns by active owners are associated with positive stock returns and better accounting performance.”

    From Mandatory CSR and sustainability reporting: economic analysis and literature review (2021) · cites this paper as Dimson et al. 2015

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Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 6

  1. [22]22. Brav, A., W. Jiang, and H. Kim. 2015. The real effects of hedge fund activism: Productivity, Asset Allocation, and Labor Outcomes. Review of Financial Studies 28:2723-69.
  2. [48]48. Global Sustainable Investment Alliance. 2015. Global sustainable investment review 2014. Global Sustainable Investment Alliance.
  3. [56]56. ---. 2000b. The rise of fiduciary capitalism. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
  4. [64]64. Katz, D. A., and L. A. McIntosh. 2015. Corporate governance update: Engagement and activism in the 2015 proxy season. New York Law Journal, January 29.
  5. [74]74. Monks, R., and N. Minow. 1995. Corporate governance. Cambridge MA: Blackwell.
  6. [83]83. Sullivan & Cromwell. 2014. 2014 proxy season review. New York: Sullivan & Cromwell (25 June).

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Authors
Dimson, E., Karakaş, O., & Li, X.
Affiliations
  • University of Cambridge (GB)
  • Boston College (US)
  • Temple University (US)
ORCID
Venue
Review of Financial Studies
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Published
2015-08-12
Volume
28
Issue
12
Pages
3225-3268
ISSN
  • 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
  • 1465-7368
DOI
10.1093/rfs/hhv044
OpenAlex
W4248292788
Cited by
1,242
References
90
Citations by year
2026: 168 · 2025: 196 · 2024: 192 · 2023: 154 · 2022: 142 · 2021: 100 · 2020: 79 · 2019: 61 · 2018: 53 · 2017: 29 · 2016: 29 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 12 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 4
FWCI
116.40
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
public-domain
Locations
  • Review of Financial Studies (publishedVersion, public-domain)
  • SSRN Electronic Journal (acceptedVersion)
  • London School of Economics and Political Science Research Online (London School of Economics and Political Science) (acceptedVersion)
  • HighWire Press Open Archive (submittedVersion)
  • Apollo (University of Cambridge) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Temple University
  • Inquire Europe
  • Fox School of Business, Temple University
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Corporate Finance and Governance
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Financial Markets and Investment Strategies
Keywords
shareholder activism, corporate social responsibility, institutional investors, environmental, social and governance issues, abnormal returns, corporate governance, institutional ownership, corporate reputation, accounting performance, public companies

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