The DOI matches its Crossref record; 52 of the 52 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Are All Inside Directors the Same? Evidence from the External Directorship Market
Abstract
Agency theory and optimal contracting theory posit opposing roles and shareholder wealth effects for corporate inside directors. We evaluate these theories using the market for outside directorships to differentiate among inside directors. Firms with inside directors holding outside directorships have better operating performance and market‐to‐book ratios, especially when monitoring is more difficult. These firms make better acquisition decisions, have greater cash holdings, and overstate earnings less often. Announcements of outside board appointments improve shareholder wealth, while departure announcements reduce it, consistent with these inside directors improving board performance and outside directorships being an important source of inside director incentives.
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Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
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Separation of Ownership and Control
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Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have
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Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
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Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500
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Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
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Cited by
The Supply of Corporate Directors and Board Independence
Knyazeva, A., Knyazeva, D., & Masulis, R. W. (2013) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hht020 · Cited by 678
Self-citationInternal Governance and Real Earnings Management
Cheng, Q., Lee, J., & Shevlin, T. (2016) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr-51275 · Cited by 412
Metadata
- Authors
- MASULIS, R. W., & MOBBS, S.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-05-23
- Volume
- 66
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 823-872
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3125114465
- Cited by
- 361
- References
- 52
- FWCI
- 67.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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