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Cited by 361

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 52 of the 52 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Are All Inside Directors the Same? Evidence from the External Directorship Market

MASULIS, RONALD W., MOBBS, SHAWN·2011·The Journal of Finance

Abstract

Agency theory and optimal contracting theory posit opposing roles and shareholder wealth effects for corporate inside directors. We evaluate these theories using the market for outside directorships to differentiate among inside directors. Firms with inside directors holding outside directorships have better operating performance and market‐to‐book ratios, especially when monitoring is more difficult. These firms make better acquisition decisions, have greater cash holdings, and overstate earnings less often. Announcements of outside board appointments improve shareholder wealth, while departure announcements reduce it, consistent with these inside directors improving board performance and outside directorships being an important source of inside director incentives.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01653.x

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Metadata

Authors
MASULIS, R. W., & MOBBS, S.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2011-05-23
Volume
66
Issue
3
Pages
823-872
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
OpenAlex
W3125114465
Cited by
361
References
52
FWCI
67.50
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Are All Inside Directors the Same? Evidence from the External Directorship Market. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01653.x
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MASULIS, R. W., & MOBBS, S. (2011). Are All Inside Directors the Same? Evidence from the External Directorship Market. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01653.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.