The DOI matches its Crossref record.
The Impact of Antitakeover Amendments on Corporate Financial Performance
Abstract
Previous event studies that examine the impact of antitakeover amendments on firm value provide mixed results. Some studies support the management entrenchment hypothesis, while others support the shareholder interest hypothesis. In this study, a longitudinal approach is used to examine the impact of antitakeover amendments on several financial attributes of the firm including: operating and net income to total assets, operating and overhead expenses to sales, research and development to total sales, capital expenditures to sales, and debt relative to total assets. It is concluded that antitakeover amendments are not deleterious in terms of their impact on various fundamental firm performance measures.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“It is worth noting that studies identifying some effects of antitakeover statutes on firms largely focused on data from an earlier period during most of which such statutes did plausibly matter because incumbents did not yet have the power to maintain poison pills indefinitely”
From What Matters in Corporate Governance? (2009) · cites this paper as Johnson and Rao (1997)
Citations
Cites
No references could be resolved yet.
Research works printed but not linked: 20
- 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04674.x · DOI
- 10.1016/1057-5219(93)90017-C · DOI
- 10.1016/0304-405X(83)90016-8 · DOI
- 10.1016/0304-405X(93)90011-Y · DOI
- 10.1086/467037 · DOI
- 10.1086/467038 · DOI
- 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb00438.x · DOI
- Grossman Sanford J., 1982, The Economics of Information and Uncertainty
- 10.2307/2555472 · DOI
- 10.1016/0304-405X(87)90032-8 · DOI
- 10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X · DOI · Paper page
- 10.1016/0304-405X(83)90004-1 · DOI
- Jensen Michael C, 1986, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers, American Economic Review, 76, 323
- 10.1016/0304-405X(78)90010-7 · DOI
- 10.1016/0304-405X(83)90017-X · DOI
- 10.1086/259000 · DOI · Paper page
- Meulbroek Lisa K., 1990, Shark Repellents and Managerial Myopia: An Empirical Test, Journal of Political Economy, 98
- 10.1111/j.1475-6803.1992.tb00786.x · DOI
- 10.1016/0304-405X(92)90009-M · DOI
- 10.1086/261524 · DOI · Paper page
Cited by
Sorted by citations
What Matters in Corporate Governance?
Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn099 · Cited by 2,906
What Matters in Corporate Governance?
Bebchuk, L. A., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2004) · doi:10.2139/ssrn.593423 · Cited by 443
The Case against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers
Bebchuk, L. A. (2002) · The University of Chicago Law Review · doi:10.2307/1600639 · Cited by 42
Metadata
- Authors
- Johnson, M. S., & Rao, R. P.
- Affiliations
- Michigan State University (US)
- Texas Tech University (US)
- ORCID
- Rao, Ramesh P.
- Venue
- Financial Review
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1997-11
- Volume
- 32
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 659-690
- ISSN
- 0732-8516 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6288
- OpenAlex
- W2036317248
- Cited by
- 57
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2023: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 2 · 2019: 2 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 3 · 2014: 1 · 2013: 4
- FWCI
- 12.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Financial Review (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Corporate Governance and Financial Management
- Keywords
- corporate financial performance, firm value, operating profit, net income, operating costs, overhead expenses, research and development, capital expenditure, debt ratio, corporate governance
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review