Workaholics and Dropouts in Organizations
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper reports the results of experiments designed to test the theory of the optimal composition of prizes in contests. In the aggregate the behavior of subjects is consistent with that predicted by the theory, but we find that such aggregate results mask an unexpected compositional effect on the individual level. Whereas theory predicts that subject efforts are continuous and increasing functions of ability, the actual efforts of our laboratory subjects bifurcate. Low-ability workers drop out and exert little or no effort, and high-ability workers try too hard. This bifurcation, which is masked by aggregation, can be explained by assuming loss aversion on the part of the subjects.
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Citations
Cites
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914185 · Cited by 48,524
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Cited by
A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2015) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-014-9421-0 · Cited by 706
Azmat, G., & Iriberri, N. (2010) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.04.001 · Cited by 390
Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests
Sheremeta, R. M. (2010) · Games and Economic Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.geb.2009.08.001 · Cited by 297
Entry into winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: An experimental study
Cason, T. N., Masters, W. A., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2010) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.05.006 · Cited by 257
All pay auctions and group size: Grading on a curve and other applications
Andreoni, J., & Brownback, A. (2017) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2017.03.017 · Cited by 18
“Still others have focused on the heterogeneity of bidding behavior in contests with a fixed size, noting a “bifurcation” between low- and high-ability types (Müller and Schotter, 2010; Noussair and Silver, 2006).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Müller, W., & Schotter, A.
- Venue
- Journal of the European Economic Association
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2010-06
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 717-743
- ISSN
- 1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2115590029
- Cited by
- 118
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 20.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Müller, W., & Schotter, A. (2010). Workaholics and Dropouts in Organizations. Journal of the European Economic Association. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00538.x
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.