The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
SELF‐INTEREST, ALTRUISM, INCENTIVES, AND AGENCY THEORY
Open accessAbstract
Many people are suspicious of self-interest and incentives and oppose motivating humans through incentives. I analyze the meaning of incentives in the logic of choice and argue that it is inconceivable that purposeful actions are anything other than responses to incentives. Money is not always the best way to motivate people. But where money incentives are required, they are required precisely because people are motivated by things other than money. Self-interest is consistent with altruistic motives. Agency problems, however, cannot be solved by instilling greater altruism in people because altruism, the concern for the well-being of others, does not make a person into a perfect agent who does the bidding of others. I discuss the universal tendency of people to behave in non-rational ways. Though they are Resourceful, Evaluative Maximizers (REMMs) humans are imperfect because their brains are biologically structured so as to blind them from perceiving and correcting errors that cause psychic pain. The result is systematic, non-functional behavior. I discuss a Pain Avoidance Model (PAM) that complements REMM by capturing the non-rational component of human behavior (the crux of human self-control problems). Recognizing these self- control problems leads to an expansion of agency theory since they are a second source of agency costs in addition to those generated by conflicts of interest between people. See also the related paper by Jensen and Meckling The Nature of Man.
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Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Self-citationThe Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
JENSEN, M. C. (1993) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x · Cited by 8,528
Self-citationAn economic theory of self-control.
Thaler, R. H., & Shefrin, H. M. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260971 · Cited by 2,203
Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory
BAKER, G. P., JENSEN, M. C., & MURPHY, K. J. (1988) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb04593.x · Cited by 1,702
Self-citationAn Economic Theory of Self-Control
Shefrin, H., & Thaler, R. (1977) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w0208 · Cited by 1,575
Teaching Smart People How to Learn
ARGYRIS, C. (2000) · Strategic Learning in a Knowledge Economy · doi:10.1016/b978-0-7506-7223-8.50015-0 · Cited by 1,408
The Theory of Moral Sentiments
(2002) · Adam Smith: The Theory of Moral Sentiments · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511800153.005 · Cited by 1,375
Knowledge for Action: A Guide to Overcoming Barriers to Organizational Change
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Cited by
Toward a theory of agency and altruism in family firms
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., & Dino, R. N. (2003) · Journal of Business Venturing · doi:10.1016/s0883-9026(03)00054-5 · Cited by 1,277
Zahra, S. A. (2003) · Journal of Business Venturing · doi:10.1016/s0883-9026(03)00057-0 · Cited by 849
Impact of ownership on the international involvement of SMEs
Fernández, Z., & Nieto, M. J. (2006) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400196 · Cited by 623
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1994) · Journal of Applied Corporate Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1745-6622.1994.tb00401.x · Cited by 610
Self-citationBeyond Greed and Fear: Understanding Behavioral Finance and the Psychology of Investing
Shefrin, H. (2002) · doi:10.1093/0195161211.001.0001 · Cited by 527
Metadata
- Authors
- Jensen, M. C.
- Venue
- Journal of Applied Corporate Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1994-06
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 40-45
- ISSN
- 1078-1196 (ISSN-L)
- 1745-6622
- OpenAlex
- W3123407851
- Cited by
- 435
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 10.13
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.