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Cited by 675

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 54 of the 54 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Active Institutional Shareholders and Costs of Monitoring: Evidence from Executive Compensation

Open access
Almazan, Andres, Hartzell, Jay C., Starks, Laura T.·2005·Financial Management
DOI 10.1111/j.1755-053x.2005.tb00116.x
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Abstract

Although evidence suggests that institutional investors play a role in monitoring management, not all institutions are equally willing or able to serve this function. We present a stylized model that examines the effects of institutional monitoring on executive compensation. The model predicts that institutions' influence on managers' pay-for-performance sensitivity and level of compensation is enhanced when institutions have lower implied costs of monitoring, but that these effects are attenuated when the firm-specific cost of monitoring is high. Our empirical results are broadly consistent with these implications, suggesting that independent investment advisors and investment company managers have advantages in monitoring firms' management.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1755-053x.2005.tb00116.x

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Metadata

Authors
Almazan, A., Hartzell, J. C., & Starks, L. T.
Venue
Financial Management
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2005-12
Volume
34
Issue
4
Pages
5-34
ISSN
  • 0046-3892 (ISSN-L)
  • 1755-053X
DOI
10.1111/j.1755-053x.2005.tb00116.x
OpenAlex
W3123208803
Cited by
675
References
54
FWCI
70.48
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Active Institutional Shareholders and Costs of Monitoring: Evidence from Executive Compensation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1755-053x.2005.tb00116.x
The paper
Almazan, A., Hartzell, J. C., & Starks, L. T. (2005). Active Institutional Shareholders and Costs of Monitoring: Evidence from Executive Compensation. Financial Management. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-053x.2005.tb00116.x

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.