The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Why do intermediaries divert search?
Open accessAbstract
We analyze the incentives to divert search for an information intermediary who enables buyers (consumers) to search affiliated sellers (stores). We identify two original motives for diverting search (i.e., inducing consumers to search more than they would like): (i) trading off higher total consumer traffic for higher revenues per consumer visit; and (ii) influencing stores’ choices of strategic variables (e.g., pricing). We characterize the conditions under which there would be no role for search diversion as a strategic instrument for the intermediary, thereby showing that it occurs even when the contracting space is significantly enriched. We then discuss several applications related to online and brick‐and‐mortar intermediaries.
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Citations
Cites
Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets
Rochet, J.-C., & Tirole, J. (2003) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/154247603322493212 · Cited by 5,642
Chicken & Egg: Competition among Intermediation Service Providers
Caillaud, B., & Jullien, B. (2003) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1593720 · Cited by 1,799
Self-citationSearch, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on the Internet
(2009) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta5708 · Cited by 562
Innovation, Openness, and Platform Control
Parker, G., & Van Alstyne, M. (2018) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2757 · Cited by 549
Cited by
Goldfarb, A., & Tucker, C. (2019) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.20171452 · Cited by 2,744
The Economics of Two-Sided Markets
Rysman, M. (2009) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.23.3.125 · Cited by 1,261
Acquisti, A., Taylor, C., & Wagman, L. (2016) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.54.2.442 · Cited by 1,283
Hagiu, A., & Wright, J. (2015) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2014.2042 · Cited by 777
Self-citationOptimal Information Disclosure
Rayo, L., & Segal, I. (2010) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/657922 · Cited by 484
Metadata
- Authors
- Hagiu, A., & Jullien, B.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2011-05-30
- Volume
- 42
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 337-362
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- 1756-2171
- OpenAlex
- W3122196877
- Cited by
- 296
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 46.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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