The Economics of Two-Sided Markets
Open accessAbstract
Broadly speaking, a two-sided market is one in which 1) two sets of agents interact through an intermediary or platform, and 2) the decisions of each set of agents affects the outcomes of the other set of agents, typically through an externality. In the case of a video game system, the intermediary is the console producer—Sony in the scenario above—while the two sets of agents are consumers and video game developers. Neither consumers nor game developers will be interested in the PlayStation if the other party is not. Similarly, a successful payment card requires both consumer usage and merchant acceptance, where both consumers and merchants value each others' participation. Many more products fit into this paradigm, such as search engines, newspapers, and almost any advertiser-supported media (examples in which consumers typically negatively value, rather than positively value, the participation of the other side), as well as most software or title-based operating systems and consumer electronics. This paper seeks to explain what two-sided markets are and why they interest economists. I discuss the strategies that firms typically consider, and I highlight a number of puzzling outcomes from the perspective of the economics of two-sided markets. Finally, I consider the implications for public policy, particularly antitrust and regulatory policy, where there have been a number of recent issues involving media, computer operating systems, and payment cards.
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Claims the paper makes
2 of 18 cited sources checked · 1 supported · 0 flagged · accuracy not yet measured
- Interpretationcitation
Two-sided markets often seem to evolve toward a situation where members of one side use a single platform and the other side uses multiple platforms.
“In fact, two-sided markets often seem to evolve toward to a situation where members of one side use a single platform and the other side uses multiple platforms; Armstrong (2006, Section 5) makes this point and provides formal analysis.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Armstrong (2006, Section 5) source
Section 5, “Competitive bottlenecks” (page unavailable), formally analyzes a market in which one group uses a single platform and the other uses multiple platforms. The discussion preceding Section 5 says several important markets resemble this configuration. The paper does not establish that markets evolve toward it over time. (LLM, conf=0.83)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
- Premisereasoning
Firms compete aggressively on the side that uses a single network in order to charge monopoly prices to the other side that is trying to reach them.
“Hence, firms compete aggressively on the side that uses a single network in order to charge monopoly prices to the other side that is trying to reach them (Armstrong, 2006).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites Armstrong, 2006 source
- Interpretationreasoning
Two-sided markets allow for a new form of price discrimination: discrimination based on heterogeneity in the attractiveness of an agent to the other side.
“In addition, two-sided markets allow for a new form of price discrimination: discrimination based on heterogeneity in the attractiveness of an agent to the other side.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Payment cards and newspapers seem much less flexible in terms of the choice of two-sidedness.
“These markets seem much less flexible in terms of the choice of two-sidedness.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisenone given
In newspapers, advertising prices depend on consumer demand for advertising, with relatively low prices for advertisements that consumers more highly value.
“Advertising prices depend on consumer demand for advertising as well, with relatively low prices for advertisements that consumers more highly value (such as classified advertisements and some local advertisements).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
- Interpretationreasoning
The two-sidedness of pricing can be more pronounced in competitive markets.
“Hence, the “twosidedness” of pricing can be more pronounced in competitive markets.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
If there are multiple competing market intermediaries, the effect of participation of one side on the other has even more bite.
“If there are multiple competing market intermediaries, the effect of participation of one side on the other has even more bite.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisenone given
Pricing to one side of a two-sided market depends not only on the demand and costs that those consumers bring but also on how their participation affects participation on the other side and the profit that is extracted from that participation.
“The main result is that pricing to one side of the market depends not only on the demand and costs that those consumers bring but also on how their participation affects participation on the other side and the profit that is extracted from that participation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Microsoft is more open than Apple.
“In this sense, Microsoft is more open than Apple.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
In the perfectly competitive scenario, the interchange fee primarily affects the terms that merchants and consumers face and the total volume of transactions.
“In this scenario, the interchange fee primarily affects the terms that merchants and consumers face and the total volume of transactions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
To the extent that a platform does not integrate, it often introduces another side to the multi-sided market calculation.
“Rather, to the extent that a platform does not integrate, it often introduces another side to the multi-sided market calculation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Such seeming anomalies as price below marginal cost or even negative prices can easily arise in a two-sided market.
“Such seeming anomalies as price below marginal cost or even negative prices can easily arise in a two-sided market.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Sony and Microsoft have given Electronic Arts, the largest game manufacturer, advantageous contracts in order to attract games to their consoles.
“Similarly, Sony and Microsoft have given Electronic Arts, the largest game manufacturer, advantageous contracts in order to attract games to their consoles (Eisenman, Parker, and Van Alstyne, 2006).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Eisenman, Parker, and Van Alstyne, 2006
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
Competition between platforms can have large price effects on the side of the market that uses a single platform and little or no effect on the side that uses multiple platforms.
“As a result, competition between platforms can have large price effects on the side of the market that uses a single platform and little or no effect on the side that uses multiple platforms.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
A platform might charge a price below cost on one side if those agents have a large price elasticity and their participation attracts a large number of participants on the other side who are relatively price inelastic and hence have a high mark-up.
“For example, a platform might charge a price below cost on one side if those agents have a large price elasticity and their participation attracts a large number of participants on the other side who are relatively price inelastic (and hence have a high mark-up).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
In a two-sided market, pricing decisions will also include the elasticity of the response on the other side and the mark-up charged to the other side.
“But in a two-sided market, pricing decisions will also include the elasticity of the response on the other side and the mark-up charged to the other side.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Compatibility need not be a zero-one decision.
“Compatibility need not be a “zero-one” decision.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisereasoning
In a situation of demand heterogeneity, standard price discrimination, for instance by manipulating the prices for participation and usage, allows a platform to capture more of the surplus on the side with discrimination.
“In a situation of demand heterogeneity, standard price discrimination-for instance, by manipulating the prices for participation and usage-allows a platform to capture more of the surplus on the side with discrimination.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Penetration pricing, such as when an intermediary lowers price early in the product life cycle and raises it after having established a base, is a natural outcome in two-sided markets.
“Penetration pricing, such as when an intermediary lowers price early in the product life cycle and raises it after having established a base, is a natural outcome in two-sided markets.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Prices on both sides of a two-sided market depend on the joint set of demand elasticities and marginal costs on each side.
“Since the platform faces a similar computation on the other side, prices on both sides of the market depend on the joint set of demand elasticities and marginal costs on each side (Rochet andTirole, 2003, 2006;Weyl, 2009).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rochet andTirole, 2003, 2006;Weyl, 2009
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisecitation
Consumers typically stick to a single card for months at a time.
“Meanwhile, consumers typically stick to a single card for months at a time (Rysman, 2007a).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rysman, 2007a
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationnone given
The intermediary can be viewed as a monopolist over access to members that do not use other intermediaries.
“It is because the intermediary can be viewed as a monopolist over access to members that do not use other intermediaries.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The technology of payment cards and media is such that adding or eliminating sides to their markets is not an important option.
“In other words, the technology of these industries is such that adding or eliminating sides to their markets is not an important option.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Outside of some particular cases, the basic model of payment cards and media is a two-sided one.
“However, outside of some particular cases, the basic model of payment cards and media is a two-sided one.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisenone given
In newspapers, consumer prices depend on advertiser demand to reach those consumers.
“Consumer prices depend on advertiser demand to reach those consumers.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Caillaud and Jullien (2003) show how an entering platform can use price discrimination to be successful even when market participants expect the entrant to fail.
“Caillaud and Jullien (2003) show how an entering platform can use price discrimination to be successful even when market participants expect the entrant to fail.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Caillaud and Jullien (2003) source
- Premisecitation
The Reserve Bank of Australia (2006) sets interchange fees based on the average cost of banks serving consumers.
“In fact, the Reserve Bank of Australia (2006) sets interchange fees based on the average cost of banks serving consumers”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reserve Bank of Australia (2006)
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
In the Nabanco case, price-measurement issues associated with two-sided markets had a limited role.
“Hence, the price-measurement issues associated with two-sided markets had a limited role.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The type of organization greatly affects public policy toward the entities.
“The type of organization greatly affects public policy toward the entities.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Tipping is less likely if agents can easily use multiple standards.
“Second, tipping is less likely if agents can easily use multiple standards.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationnone given
In a two-sided market, if the merger reduces cost on one side, that has implications for price on the other side.
“In a two-sided market, if the merger reduces cost on one side, that has implications for price on the other side.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationnone given
A merger could increase market power on both sides of the market and still lead to a price decline on one side.
“Also, a merger could increase market power on both sides of the market and still lead to a price decline on one side.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
If standards can differentiate from each other, they may be able to successfully coexist.
“First, if standards can differentiate from each other, they may be able to successfully coexist (Chou and Shy, 1990;Church and Gandal, 1992).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Chou and Shy, 1990;Church and Gandal, 1992
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Premisereasoning
The Nabanco court did not inquire into whether Visa set the optimal interchange fee.
“Once the court established that setting an interchange fee is legal, it did not inquire into whether Visa set the optimal interchange fee.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
In the Microsoft case, the importance of two-sided markets to the tying issue is ambiguous.
“The importance of two-sided markets here is ambiguous.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Two-sided market issues become important when the court includes price computations in questions of legality.
“Hence, two-sided market issues become important when the court includes price computations in questions of legality.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: In December 2007, the European Commission ruled that the interchange fee at MasterCard for cross-border transactions is collusive and illegal.
- Rests on an assumption: MasterCard can exist with a zero-interchange fee.
- Interpretationreasoning
Computing antitrust damages, which often involves computing counterfactual prices, could be influenced by whether a market is two-sided.
“Such a computation could easily be influenced by whether a market is two-sided or not.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The design of remedies for antitrust violations might be affected by whether a market is two-sided.
“Similarly, the design of remedies for antitrust violations might be affected.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
The ability of providers of complementary goods to differentiate themselves after picking a platform makes tipping more likely.
“Third, the ability of providers of complementary goods to differentiate themselves after picking a platform makes tipping more likely (Ellison and Fudenberg, 2003;Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman, 2006).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ellison and Fudenberg, 2003;Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman, 2006
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationreasoning
If one side of the market can be made exclusive, there is usually little reason to seek exclusivity on the other side.
“If one side of the market can be made exclusive, there is usually little reason to seek exclusivity on the other side.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
In a two-sided market, a price increase to consumers on platform A affects participation of A's sellers, which may affect the sellers that B sees and lead to an effect on B's consumers over and above the standard substitution effect from A's consumer price change.
“We must recognize that the response by A's consumers will also affect participation of A's sellers, which may affect the sellers that B sees and lead to an effect on B's consumers over and above the standard substitution effect from A's consumer price change.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Exclusive dealing and tying potentially have added benefits in a two-sided market that might be important counterpoints to the standard antitrust criticism that they may create entry barriers.
“Thus, exclusive dealing and tying potentially have added benefits in a two-sided market that might be important counterpoints to the standard antitrust criticism that they may create entry barriers.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
If members of one side use only one platform at a time, the platform can charge monopoly prices to the other side for access.
“As argued above, if members of one side use only one platform at a time, the platform can charge monopoly prices to the other side for access.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
If two-sidedness is important, one must account for the endogenous variation in other prices in response to any one price.
“If two-sidedness is important, we must account for the endogenous variation in other prices in response to any one price.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Antitrust authorities typically use the size of cross-price elasticities to determine what products should be included in a relevant market.
- Premisereasoning
In the Microsoft case, once market power was established, the case hinged on whether tying the browser to the operating system created an entry barrier into the operating system market.
“However, once market power was established, the case hinged on whether tying the browser to the operating system created an entry barrier into the operating system market.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The economics of two-sided markets is not important for all aspects of antitrust analysis.
“But that does not mean that it is important for all aspects of antitrust analysis.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 34
- May combine two claims. 39
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone givenThe merchant's bank must pay the consumer's bank an interchange fee, a percent of each transaction.
“Of great controversy is that the merchant's bank must pay the consumer's bank an “interchange fee,” a percent of each transaction.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisenone givenProviders of platforms often prefer incompatibility on the grounds that it locks in current customers and locks out competitors.
“Providers of platforms often prefer incompatibility on the grounds that it locks in current customers and locks out competitors.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe interchange fee presumably explains why banks can offer generous rewards programs to consumers for using their credit cards.
“The interchange fee presumably explains why banks can offer generous rewards programs to consumers for using their credit cards.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThis result might explain why payment card pricing has increasingly favored consumers over time rather than merchants, since consumers and not merchants typically use a single network and competition among card networks has become more important relative to competition between card networks and cash.
“This result might explain why payment card pricing has increasingly favored consumers over time rather than merchants (for instance, with the rise of rewards programs), since consumers and not merchants typically use a single network and competition among card networks has become more important relative to competition between card networks and cash.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningPayment associations offered supermarkets relatively low interchange fees, which led to low bank fees and ultimately to the adoption of payment card usage by supermarkets.
“Hence, payment associations offered supermarkets relatively low interchange fees, which led to low bank fees and ultimately to the adoption of payment card usage by supermarkets.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThese changes do not appear to have led to a strategic change with respect to interchange policy.
“These changes do not appear to have led to a strategic change with respect to interchange policy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationIf serving consumers and merchants is perfectly competitive, then the interchange fee does not affect the profits of the member banks.
“However, as Rochet and Tirole (2002) point out, if serving consumers and merchants is perfectly competitive, then the interchange fee does not affect the profits of the member banks.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rochet and Tirole (2002) source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIt may be better to discuss two-sided strategies rather than two-sided markets, because two-sidedness is an endogenous choice in some markets, not a technologically determined outcome.
“Thus, it may be better to discuss two-sided “strategies” rather than two-sided “markets,” because two-sidedness is an endogenous choice in some markets, not a technologically determined outcome.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenThe interchange fee is set by the card association, and in this sense is set cooperatively by the member banks.
“The interchange fee is set by the card association, and in this sense is set cooperatively by the member banks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenMerchants typically accept payment on multiple networks, for example Visa, Mastercard, American Express, and Discover, as well as via alternatives such as on-line debit cards and personal checks.
“Merchants typically accept payment on multiple networks-for example, Visa, Mastercard, American Express, and Discover-as well as via alternatives such as on-line debit cards and personal checks.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone givenNewspapers are a canonical two-sided market, where the newspaper provides a platform for communication from advertisers to consumers.
“Newspapers are a canonical two-sided market, where the newspaper provides a platform for communication from advertisers to consumers.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIn any market, prices typically fall as the price elasticity of demand increases, but in a two-sided market the effect can be even larger: the low price on one side not only attracts elastic consumers on that side but also leads to higher prices or more participation on the other side.
“For instance, in any market, prices typically fall as the price elasticity of demand increases, but in a two-sided market the effect can be even larger: The low price on one side not only attracts elastic consumers on that side but also, as a result, leads to higher prices or more participation on the other side.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningLowering the consumer price attracts consumers from the competing platform, which degrades the value of the competitor to buyers, and hence leads to a larger increase in buyer interest in the original platform.
“But now, lowering the consumer price attracts consumers from the competing platform, which degrades the value of the competitor to buyers, and hence leads to a larger increase in buyer interest in the original platform.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
PremisereasoningThe merchant's fee is set to reflect the interchange cost and is usually only slightly higher than the interchange fee.
“The merchant's fee is set to reflect this cost and is usually only slightly higher than the interchange fee.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenA successful operating system requires consumer adoption as well as software development by software vendors.
“A successful operating system requires consumer adoption as well as software development by software vendors.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationDiscrimination increases the value extracted on one side, which leads to lower prices on the other side which has now become more valuable.
“Thus, discrimination increases the value extracted on one side, which leads to lower prices on the other side which has now become more valuable (Weyl, 2009).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Weyl, 2009 source
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningMicrosoft can be characterized as managing a three-sided market between consumers, software providers, and hardware providers, whereas Apple manages only a two-sided market between consumers and software providers.
“That is, we can characterize Microsoft as managing a three-sided market between consumers, software providers, and hardware providers, whereas Apple manages only a two-sided market between consumers and software providers.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenMastercard and Visa incorporated in 2006 and 2007 and so are organized as for-profit corporations rather than as associations or cooperatives.
“Note that Mastercard and Visa incorporated in 2006 and 2007 and so are organized as for-profit corporations rather than as associations or cooperatives.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Premisenone givenPayment cards like Visa, MasterCard, and American Express are two-sided in the sense that they require consumer usage and merchant acceptance to be successful.
“Payment cards like Visa, MasterCard, and American Express are two-sided in the sense that they require consumer usage and merchant acceptance to be successful.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenIt is common to establish a technological standard through free distribution of a basic product and then profit on peripheral products.
“Similarly, it is common to establish a technological standard through free distribution of a basic product (for instance, Adobe's free distribution of Reader popularizes the PDF standard) and then profit on peripheral products (such as Adobe Acrobat).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisereasoningA successful payment card requires both consumer usage and merchant acceptance, where both consumers and merchants value each other's participation.
“Similarly, a successful payment card requires both consumer usage and merchant acceptance, where both consumers and merchants value each others' participation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Premisenone givenIn markets with multiple newspapers, consumers typically read only one newspaper whereas advertisers appear in all of them.
“In markets with multiple newspapers, consumers typically read only one newspaper whereas advertisers appear in all of them.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAdvertising to one side that raises the mark-up on that side leads to lower prices on the other side, and vice versa.
“In addition, there is a more subtle effect through mark-ups: advertising to one side that raises the mark-up on that side leads to lower prices on the other side, and vice versa.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationIf there is no antitrust violation in setting interchange fees but the equilibrium outcome diverges from the social optimum, then price regulation may be a reasonable solution.
“If there is no antitrust violation in setting interchange fees but the equilibrium outcome diverges from the social optimum (as in Rochet and Tirole, 2002), then price regulation may be a reasonable solution.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rochet and Tirole, 2002 source
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationIt is unlikely that the theory of two-sided markets will have much effect on predatory pricing prosecution, although there is some movement to make predatory pricing easier to prosecute.
“As such, it is unlikely that the theory of two-sided markets will have much effect here, although there is some movement to make predatory pricing easier to prosecute(Brodley, Bolton, and Riordan, 2000).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Brodley, Bolton, and Riordan, 2000
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationIf sellers cannot differentiate aside from adopting a standard, they must differentiate by choosing separate standards, which leads to the adoption of multiple standards or even adoption failure.
“If the sellers cannot differentiate aside from adopting a standard, they must differentiate by choosing separate standards, which leads to the adoption of multiple standards (Ellison and Fudenberg, 2003) or even adoption failure (Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman, 2006;Kretschmer, 2008).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Ellison and Fudenberg, 2003 source
- cites Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman, 2006;Kretschmer, 2008
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationCash is more costly to process than credit card payments, whereas electronic debit is cheaper.
“For instance, cash is more costly to process than credit card payments, whereas electronic debit is cheaper (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2007).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Reserve Bank of Australia, 2007
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe economics of two-sided markets can play an important role in guiding the determination of the optimal interchange fee, although it does not appear to have done so to date.
“The economics of two-sided markets can play an important role in guiding the determination of the optimal fee, although it does not appear to have done so to date.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationKnittel and Stango (2008) argue that deregulating surcharges for ATMs had a major role in causing the expansion.
“Knittel and Stango (2008) argue that deregulating surcharges for ATMs had a major role in causing the expansion.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Knittel and Stango (2008) source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
PremisereasoningTwo-sided markets typically have network effects and as such are likely to tip toward a single dominant platform.
“Two-sided markets typically have network effects and as such are likely to tip toward a single dominant platform.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningFees were deregulated in the ATM market, in contrast with the current trend toward regulation in payment cards.
“Hence, fees were deregulated in this market, in contrast with the current trend toward regulation in payment cards.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Increased prices led to more consumer usage rather than less because ATMs were much more conveniently located.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningPersuasive advertising on one side can lead to lower prices on the other side, whereas informative advertising on one side leads to higher prices on the other.
“Thus, persuasive advertising on one side can lead to lower prices on the other side, whereas informative advertising on one side leads to higher prices on the other.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenVideo games compete with a host of leisure activities for consumer attention, but not for game developer attention.
“Video games compete with a host of leisure activities for consumer attention, but not for game developer attention.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationnone givenThe economics of two-sided markets is highly relevant for pricing analysis in antitrust.
“It seems clear that the economics of two-sided markets is highly relevant for pricing analysis in antitrust.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe literature on two-sided markets has important policy implications for pricing analysis, an important feature of regulation and a large part of antitrust analysis.
“The literature has important policy implications for pricing analysis, an important feature of regulation and a large part of antitrust analysis.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenThe author predicts that two-sided analysis will grow in importance in areas where pricing analysis is important, whereas the effect will be more limited in exclusionary conduct cases such as monopolization and conditional sales.
“In general, my prediction is that two-sided analysis will grow in importance in areas where pricing analysis is important, whereas the effect will be more limited in exclusionary conduct cases such as monopolization and conditional sales.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIn the Nabanco case, the technical legal question was about cooperation and the nature of the Visa association, not about two-sided markets.
“However, the technical legal question was about cooperation and the nature of the Visa association, not about two-sided markets.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenNewspapers compete with billboards for advertising, but not for consumer readership.
“For example, newspapers compete with billboards for advertising, but not for consumer readership.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe interchange fees imposed in Australia may or may not raise social welfare, but the process for determining the fee surely diverges from the prescription of the economics of two-sided markets.
“The interchange fees imposed in Australia may or may not raise social welfare, but the process for determining the fee surely diverges from the prescription of the economics of two-sided markets.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIn the Microsoft monopolization case, pricing issues were crucial and two-sided market concerns were relatively important in establishing market power.
“Here, pricing issues were crucial and two-sided market concerns were relatively important.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenEconomic theory suggests that any determination of the optimal interchange fee should consider the marginal costs of serving both consumers and merchants as well as price elasticities of demand and interaction elasticities of demand to usage on the other side of the market.
“Economic theory suggests that any determination of the optimal interchange fee should consider the marginal costs of serving both consumers and merchants as well as price elasticities of demand and interaction elasticities of demand to usage on the other side of the market.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningFrom different perspectives, the same business may have different numbers of sides.
“From different perspectives, the same business may have different numbers of sides.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenCertain more subtle strategies are more common in two-sided than in one-sided markets.
“Certain more subtle strategies are more common in two-sided than in onesided markets.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningAdvertising on one side raises participation and usage on that side, which raises demand on the other side, and so advertising on one side can lead to higher prices on the other.
“Advertising on one side raises participation and usage on that side, which raises demand on the other side, and so advertising on one side can lead to higher prices on the other.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIn monopolization cases, determining the difference between optimal and equilibrium prices has little role in establishing the legality of an action, although it may have an important role in determining whether a firm has market power.
“That is, determining the difference between optimal and equilibrium prices has little role in establishing the legality of an action in a monopolization case (although it may have an important role in determining the requisite question of whether a firm has market power).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Inefficient pricing is not an antitrust violation by itself.
- Rests on an assumption: Monopolization and vertical contracting cases typically hinge on whether a firm has excluded competitors from the market in a way that did not benefit consumers or reduce costs.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationIn the Nabanco v. Visa case, the court deemed the alternative to collective setting of interchange fees-independent bilateral negotiation-unworkable, and hence the collectively set interchange fee was legal as necessary to provide the Visa card.
“The court deemed that system unworkable, and hence the collectively set interchange fee was legal as it was necessary to provide the Visa card.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites National Bancard Corp.(Nabanco) v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. (779 F.2d 592 [11 th Cir.1986])
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningInternet service providers can be seen as platforms matching Internet users to content providers, and hence the concept of net neutrality is often evaluated from the perspective of two-sided markets.
“The Internet service providers can be seen as platforms matching Internet users to content providers and hence, the concept of net neutrality is often evaluated from the perspective of two-sided markets.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe economics of two-sided markets provides insights primarily into pricing and so is likely to be particularly important for the parts of antitrust enforcement that focus on pricing issues.
“The economics of two-sided markets provides insights primarily into pricing and so is likely to be particularly important for the parts of antitrust enforcement that focus on pricing issues.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIn a two-sided market, we should consider multiple prices and, potentially, different measures of competition for each side.
“In a two-sided market, we should consider multiple prices and, potentially, different measures of competition for each side.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe economics of two-sided markets are important for a wide variety of public policy issues.
“The economics of two-sided markets are important for a wide variety of public policy issues.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningPricing issues are the main thrust of a great deal of economic regulation, and as such, the economics of two-sided markets can make a large contribution.
“Pricing issues are the main thrust of a great deal of economic regulation, and as such, the economics of two-sided markets can make a large contribution.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenA platform firm must be concerned not only with its own quality and advertising, but also that of the vendors who operate over its network.
“Also, a platform firm must be concerned not only with its own quality and advertising, but also that of the vendors who operate over its network.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe effects of quality investment will depend on whether it generates relatively price-elastic or -inelastic consumers on the margin, and on whether it attracts consumers that are more or less responsive to participation on the other side.
“Similarly, the effects of quality investment will depend on whether it generates relatively price-elastic or -inelastic consumers on the margin, and on whether it attracts consumers that are more or less responsive to participation on the other side.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningIn the Microsoft case, pricing was not a primary issue in the calculation of consumer benefits versus losses from a weakened Netscape, and it is unclear that two-sided market economics offers much guidance.
“Pricing was not a primary issue in this calculation, and it is unclear that two-sided market economics offers much guidance.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenAn ATM network is two-sided in the sense that it is more valuable to consumers if it can reach more banks and more valuable to banks if more consumers use it, which is often a function of how many locations a network reaches.
“A network of ATMs is two-sided in the sense that it is more valuable to consumers if it can reach more banks and more valuable to banks if more consumers use it, which is often a function of how many locations a network reaches.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenCommon strategies in one-sided markets like innovation, advertising, and quality investment can take on added dimensions in a two-sided market.
“Common strategies in one-sided markets like innovation, advertising, and quality investment can take on added dimensions in a two-sided market.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
Two-sidedness may exist in practically all markets.
“That is, although two-sidedness may exist in practically all markets, it is not always quantitatively important.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The difference in industries between the two-sided markets literature and the network effects literature is not crucial.
“However, the difference in industries is not crucial, and there are exceptions on both sides.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The two-sided markets literature and the network effects literature have a lot in common.
“Many papers that study operating systems identify themselves with network effects rather than two-sided markets so perhaps this example is less canonical, but as I have argued, the two literatures have a lot in common.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Antitrust authorities typically use the size of cross-price elasticities to determine what products should be included in a relevant market.
“Antitrust authorities typically use the size of cross-price elasticities to determine what products should be included in a relevant market.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Inefficient pricing is not an antitrust violation by itself.
“Although inefficient pricing is the hallmark of the economic criticism of monopoly power, inefficient pricing is not an antitrust violation by itself.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Monopolization and vertical contracting cases typically hinge on whether a firm has excluded competitors from the market in a way that did not benefit consumers or reduce costs.
“Monopolization and vertical contracting cases typically hinge on whether a firm has excluded competitors from the market in a way that did not benefit consumers or reduce costs.”
The paper relies on this without support.
In December 2007, the European Commission ruled that the interchange fee at MasterCard for cross-border transactions is collusive and illegal.
“In December 2007, the European Commission ruled that the interchange fee at MasterCard (for crossborder transaction) is collusive and illegal.”
The paper relies on this without support.
MasterCard can exist with a zero-interchange fee.
“Since MasterCard can exist with a zero-interchange fee, the exemption to the joint behavior was eliminated.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Increased prices led to more consumer usage rather than less because ATMs were much more conveniently located.
“Furthermore, increased prices led to more consumer usage rather than less because ATMs were much more conveniently located.”
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Conflicting RAND journal volumes for the same 2006 issue
MinorThe references assign volume 37, issue 3 and volume 35, issue 3 of The RAND Journal of Economics to 2006. Both cannot identify that journal's third issue in the same year.
“Armstrong, Mark. 2006. "Competition in Two- Sided Markets." The RAND Journal of Economics, 37(3): 668 -91.”
“Rochet, Jean-Charles, and Jean Tirole. 2006. "Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report." The RAND Journal of Economics, 35(3): 645-67.”
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The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry
Zervas, G., Proserpio, D., & Byers, J. W. (2017) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1509/jmr.15.0204 · Cited by 2,376 · see citing works
“theory of two-sided markets, for example through structural models that establish theories of price structure and usage (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Rysman, 2009; Weyl, 2010), and models which connect innovations in product design to network effects (Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005).”
Bridging differing perspectives on technological platforms: Toward an integrative framework
Gawer, A. (2014) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/j.respol.2014.03.006 · Cited by 1,869 · see citing works
Networks, platforms, and strategy: Emerging views and next steps
McIntyre, D. P., & Srinivasan, A. (2017) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2596 · Cited by 1,109 · see citing works
Open Platform Strategies and Innovation: Granting Access vs. Devolving Control
Boudreau, K. J. (2010) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1100.1215 · Cited by 984 · see citing works
Hagiu, A., & Wright, J. (2015) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.03.003 · Cited by 1,059 · see citing works
A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms
Weyl, E. G. (2010) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.100.4.1642 · Cited by 741 · see citing works
“By E. GLEN WEYL∗ Draft: October 6, 2009 I develop a general theory of monopoly pricing of networks.”
BackgroundHagiu, A., & Wright, J. (2014) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2014.2042 · Cited by 786 · see citing works
“According to some existing definitions, grocery stores are examples of multi-sided platforms even though many economists think they are not (e.g. Rochet and Tirole 2006, and Rysman 2009).”
Boudreau, K. J. (2012) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.1110.0678 · Cited by 676 · see citing works
“…that that we might begin to understand innovation incentives by likening groups of applications producers on a platform to markets of competing innovators, in which case varying intensity of competition and rivalry should shape innovation incentives (Parker and Van Alstyne 2008, Rysman 2009).”
Platform Ecosystems: How Developers Invert the Firm
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“…literature conceives of platforms as mediating markets with network externalities that cross distinct user groups and shows how subsidies to one group become optimal (Caillaud and Jullien 2003; Eisenmann et al. 2006; Parker and Van Alstyne 2000a, 2000b, 2005; Rochet and Tirole 2003; Rysman 2009).”
Markets: The Credit Rating Agencies
White, L. J. (2010) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.24.2.211 · Cited by 633 · see citing works
“Fourth, the bond rating business, like many information industries, involves a “two-sided market,” where payments can come from one or both sides of the market (as discussed in this journal by Rysman, 2009).”
BigTech and the changing structure of financial intermediation
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“For example, BigTech firms could exploit network externalities resulting in the creation of seemingly impenetrable barriers to market entry even by innovative companies (Rysman, 2009).”
Global platforms and ecosystems: Implications for international business theories
Nambisan, S., Zahra, S. A., & Luo, Y. (2019) · Journal of International Business Studies · doi:10.1057/s41267-019-00262-4 · Cited by 587 · see citing works
Platform Ecosystems: Aligning Architecture, Governance, and Strategy
Tiwana, A. (2013) · Cited by 563 · see citing works
The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel IndustryPreprint
Zervas, G., Proserpio, D., & Byers, J. (2013) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2366898 · Cited by 563 · see citing works
Ridesourcing systems: A framework and review
Wang, H., & Yang, H. (2019) · Transportation Research Part B Methodological · doi:10.1016/j.trb.2019.07.009 · Cited by 542 · see citing works
Platform Competition: A Systematic and Interdisciplinary Review of the Literature
Rietveld, J., & Schilling, M. A. (2020) · Journal of Management · doi:10.1177/0149206320969791 · Cited by 523 · see citing works
“In many platform ecosystems, there are “chicken-and-egg” problems that have to be overcome for the platform to thrive (Caillaud & Jullien, 2003; Rochet & Tirole, 2003; Rysman, 2009).”
Value Creation through Novel Resource Configurations in a Digitally Enabled World
Amit, R. H., & Han, X. (2017) · Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal · doi:10.1002/sej.1256 · Cited by 483 · see citing works
“Prototype C illustrates the resource con fi guration in a fi rm-enabled two-sided market, which has been increasingly adopted by fi rms in the digital age (Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2006; Rysman, 2009).”
BackgroundResponses to Entry in Multi-Sided Markets: The Impact of Craigslist on Local Newspapers
Seamans, R. C., & Zhu, F. (2014) · Management Sciences · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2013.1785 · Cited by 343 · see citing works
Unpaid Crowd Complementors: The Platform Network Effect Mirage
Boudreau, K. J., & Jeppesen, L. B. (2014) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2324 · Cited by 381 · see citing works
“The prevailing characterization of platforms in the literature is as a multi-sided market in which complementors selling to users can generate cross-platform or “indirect” network effects (e.g., Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005; Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Rysman, 2009).”
Marchand, A., & Hennig‐Thurau, T. (2013) · Journal of Interactive Marketing · doi:10.1016/j.intmar.2013.05.001 · Cited by 356 · see citing works
The Digital Entrepreneurial EcosystemPreprint
Ács, Z. J., & Sussan, F. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2918535 · Cited by 336 · see citing works
Bridging Differing Perspectives on Technological Platforms: Toward an Integrative Framework
Gawer, A. (2014) · Academy of Management Proceedings · doi:10.5465/ambpp.2014.278 · Cited by 319 · see citing works
Understanding FinTech start-ups – a taxonomy of consumer-oriented service offerings
Gimpel, H., Rau, D., & Röglinger, M. (2017) · Electronic Markets · doi:10.1007/s12525-017-0275-0 · Cited by 321 · see citing works
“The user ’ s currency dimen-sion covers the currency with which the users pays for using a service (Baden-Fuller and Haefliger 2013; Eisenmann et al. 2006; Rysman 2009).”
BackgroundMehrotra, R., McInerney, J., Bouchard, H., Lalmas, M., & Díaz, F. (2018) · ACM International Conference on Information and Knowledge Management (CIKM) · doi:10.1145/3269206.3272027 · Cited by 280 · see citing works
“…incorporating (business) constraints while optimizing metrics in a ranking setting [24] Marketplaces: Research on platforms, and marketplaces have enjoyed a long history of detailed research [23, 26], with past work exploring competition [3], strategies [7] and economies [16] in such marketplaces.”
BackgroundThe Digital Entrepreneurial Ecosystem—a critique and reconfiguration
Song, A. K. (2019) · Small Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s11187-019-00232-y · Cited by 285 · see citing works
“Although somewhat self-referential, it is an important and necessary distinction given how much confusion revolves around the term (Rysman 2009).”
BackgroundSong, P., Xue, L., Rai, A., & Zhang, C. (2018) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.25300/misq/2018/13737 · Cited by 273 · see citing works
The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses
Evans, D. S., & Schmalensee, R. (2013) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w18783 · Cited by 273 · see citing works
Scoping the Sharing Economy: Origins, Definitions, Impact and Regulatory IssuesPreprint
Codagnone, C., & Martens, B. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2783662 · Cited by 272 · see citing works
“Furthermore, network effects can lead to tip toward a single dominant platform (Rysman, 2009).”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialThe information value of online social networks: Lessons from peer-to-peer lending
Freedman, S. M., & Jin, G. Z. (2017) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.09.002 · Cited by 233 · see citing works
Quantifying Cross and Direct Network Effects in Online Consumer-to-Consumer Platforms
Chu, J., & Manchanda, P. (2016) · Marketing Science · doi:10.1287/mksc.2016.0976 · Cited by 231 · see citing works
“Research on two-sided markets has a relatively short history (see Rysman 2009 and Sriram et al. 2015 for an overview).”
BackgroundConsumer Price Search and Platform Design in Internet Commerce
Dinerstein, M., Liran Einav, B., Levin, J., & Sundaresan, N. (2018) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20171218 · Cited by 217 · see citing works
Pricing in Ride-Share Platforms: A Queueing-Theoretic ApproachPreprint
Banerjee, S., Riquelme, C., & Johari, R. (2015) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2568258 · Cited by 228 · see citing works
Ondruš, J., Collis, A., & Lyytinen, K. (2015) · Journal of Information Technology · doi:10.1057/jit.2015.7 · Cited by 227 · see citing works
“The growth of multi-sided platforms depends simultaneously on the positive sameside and cross-side network effects (Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005; Rysman, 2009).”
BackgroundInfluentialJacobides, M. G., Cennamo, C., & Gawer, A. (2024) · Research Policy · doi:10.1016/j.respol.2023.104906 · Cited by 220 · see citing works
“…so-called “ sides ” ), and referred to as “ two-sided markets, ” “ multi-sided markets, ” or “ multi-sided platforms ” (MSPs); essentially, specific market architectures (Armstrong, 2006; Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Evans et al., 2008; Evans, 2003; Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Rysman, 2009).”
InfluentialCong, L. W., Li, Y., & Wang, N. (2021) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.10.002 · Cited by 222 · see citing works
Competition Between Two-Sided Platforms Under Demand and Supply Congestion Effects
Bernstein, F., DeCroix, G. A., & Keskin, N. B. (2020) · Manufacturing & Service Operations Management · doi:10.1287/msom.2020.0866 · Cited by 216 · see citing works
“, Knowledge@ Wharton (2017), Sherman (2017), Wilhelm (2017), and Cook and Price (2018)).”
BackgroundThe evolution of the global digital platform economy: 1971–2021
Ács, Z. J., Song, A. K., Szerb, L., Audretsch, D. B., & Komlosi, E. S. (2021) · Small Business Economics · doi:10.1007/s11187-021-00561-x · Cited by 266 · see citing works
“…markets, or multisided platforms, are seen as special kinds of firms that facilitate exchange by allowing direct transactions between different types of consumers who could not otherwise transact (Armstrong, 2006; Evans et al., 2008; Evans, 2003; Rochet & Tirole, 2003, 2006; Rysman, 2009).”
Multi-sided platforms as new organizational forms
McIntyre, D., Srinivasan, A., Afuah, A., Gawer, A., & Kretschmer, T. (2020) · Academy of Management Perspectives · doi:10.5465/amp.2018.0018 · Cited by 151 · see citing works
Platform competition: Who benefits from multihoming?
Belleflamme, P., & Peitz, M. (2018) · International Journal of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.03.014 · Cited by 193 · see citing works
The Digital Transformation of News Media and the Rise of Disinformation and Fake NewsPreprint
Martens, B., Aguiar, L. L. M., GGmez, E., & Mueller‐Langer, F. (2018) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3164170 · Cited by 210 · see citing works
“Anderson & Waldfogel (2016, p 49) and Rysman (2009) point out that a stronger advertising side (in terms of revenue per visitor) implies that access costs are lower on the reader side because that attracts more readers to the ads.”
Can We Predict the Winner in a Market with Network Effects? Competition in Cryptocurrency Market
Gandal, N., & Hałaburda, H. (2016) · Games · doi:10.3390/g7030016 · Cited by 202 · see citing works
Data-driven innovation: switching the perspective on Big Data
Trabucchi, D., & Buganza, T. (2018) · European Journal of Innovation Management · doi:10.1108/ejim-01-2018-0017 · Cited by 181 · see citing works
Government green procurement spillovers: Evidence from municipal building policies in California
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Outsourcing Tasks Online: Matching Supply and Demand on Peer-to-Peer Internet Platforms
Cullen, Z. B., & Farronato, C. (2020) · Management Sciences · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2020.3730 · Cited by 138 · see citing works
“Our research contributes to a growing literature studying multi-sided platforms as a distinct business model (Evans (2003), Rysman (2009), Allon et al. (2012), Hagiu and Wright (2015) ) that competes with more traditional service providers (Seamans and Zhu (2013), Zervas et al. (2016), and…”
From proprietary to collective governance: How do platform participation strategies evolve?
O'Mahony, S. C., & Karp, R. (2020) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.3150 · Cited by 165 · see citing works
Fostering digital platform innovation: From two to multi‐sided platforms
Trabucchi, D., & Buganza, T. (2019) · Creativity and Innovation Management · doi:10.1111/caim.12320 · Cited by 158 · see citing works
Digital platform-based business models – An exploration of critical success factors
Rohn, D., Bican, P. M., Brem, A., Kraus, S., & Clauß, T. (2021) · Journal of Engineering and Technology Management · doi:10.1016/j.jengtecman.2021.101625 · Cited by 155 · see citing works
A Short Survey of Network Economics
Shy, O. (2011) · Review of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1007/s11151-011-9288-6 · Cited by 154 · see citing works
Development and competition of digital service platforms: A system dynamics approach
Ruutu, S., Casey, T. H., & Kotovirta, V. (2017) · Technological Forecasting and Social Change · doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2016.12.011 · Cited by 150 · see citing works
“Rysman (2009) alsomentions the possibility for the providers of complimentary goods to differentiate their offerings as a factor that may lead to a winner-take-all situation.”
Explaining adoption and use of payment instruments by US consumers
Koulayev, S., Rysman, M., Schuh, S. D., et al. (2016) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12129 · Cited by 147 · see citing works
“Our paper is relevant for the literature on two-sided markets as well (see Rochet and Tirole 2006; Rysman 2009; Hagiu and Wright 2011).”
Self-citationRegulating TNCs: Should Uber and Lyft set their own rules?
Li, S., Tavafoghi, H., Poolla, K. R., & Varaiya, P. P. (2019) · Transportation Research Part B Methodological · doi:10.1016/j.trb.2019.09.008 · Cited by 130 · see citing works
“See [23] and [24] for a summary of literature on two-sided platforms, and [25] for a general theory of monopoly pricing in multi-sided platforms.”
BackgroundWhy Do People Consume and Provide Sharing Economy Accommodation?—A Sustainability Perspective
Sung, E., Kim, H., & Lee, D. (2018) · Sustainability · doi:10.3390/su10062072 · Cited by 133 · see citing works
“In the two-sided market, service users and service providers interact across the platform, and the value of the platform increases with the size of the network [7].”
BackgroundPlatform Desertion by App Developers
Tiwana, A. (2015) · Journal of Management Information Systems · doi:10.1080/07421222.2015.1138365 · Cited by 130 · see citing works
“Apps are central to vibrant platform ecosystems [13, 54], but they are plagued by high mortality rates ( 41 – 69 percent in recent estimates [ 73] Coordination costs borne by app developers can be the Achilles ’ heel in platform ecosystems, which potentially span millions of asynchronously evolving…”
BackgroundWhy Do Payment Card Networks Charge Proportional Fees?
Shy, O., & Wang, Z. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.4.1575 · Cited by 125 · see citing works
“max Π = − = ∙ (− )(1− ) − ̧ ∙ (− )(1− ) ̧− 1 (11)”
Platforms as service ecosystems: Lessons from social media
Alaimo, C., Kallinikos, J., & Valderrama, E. (2019) · Journal of Information Technology · doi:10.1177/0268396219881462 · Cited by 125 · see citing works
“This two-way interdependence constitutes multi-sided platforms as a distinct type of digital intermediaries and confers value to the role of intermediation they perform (Rysman, 2009).”
BackgroundPlatform Ecosystems: How Developers Invert the FirmPreprint
Parker, G., Alstyne, M. V., & Jiang, X. (2016) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2861574 · Cited by 123 · see citing works
Regional income disparities, monopoly and finance
Feldman, M. P., Guy, F., & Iammarino, S. (2020) · Cambridge Journal of Regions Economy and Society · doi:10.1093/cjres/rsaa024 · Cited by 127 · see citing works
“Platforms— those serving primarily as intermediaries between customer and supplier—have complex pricing problems to solve (see Rysman 2009, for a summary).”
BackgroundNucciarelli, A., Li, F., Fernandes, K. J., Goumagias, N. D., Cabras, I., Devlin, S., Kudenko⋆, D., & Cowling, P. (2017) · Journal of Business Research · doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2016.12.030 · Cited by 119 · see citing works
“Thereafter, the technological innovation embedded in hardware and software solutions has led to the transformation of the industry first into a two-sided market and then into a multi-sided market (Rysman, 2009).”
BackgroundChang, H., & Sokol, D. D. (2020) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.3201 · Cited by 122 · see citing works
Digitization and the Contract Labor Market: A Research Agenda
Agrawal, A. K., Horton, J. J., Lacetera, N., & Lyons, E. (2013) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w19525 · Cited by 119 · see citing works
“Consistent with other two-sided markets, intermediaries in online markets take actions to ensure the participation of both suppliers and buyers (Armstrong, 2006; Rysman, 2009).”
BackgroundSemi-collusion in media markets
Dewenter, R., Haucap, J., & Wenzel, T. (2011) · International Review of Law and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.irle.2011.02.001 · Cited by 113 · see citing works
“A negative attitude towards advertising leads to negative indirect net- 4For surveys of this literature see Roson (2005), Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) and Rysman (2009).”
BackgroundPaywalls and the demand for news
Chiou, L., & Tucker, C. E. (2013) · Information Economics and Policy · doi:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2013.03.001 · Cited by 111 · see citing works
“2 The debate reflects how newspapers serve as a multi-sided platform or network by bringing together readers and advertisers (Rysman, 2009; Chandra, 2009; Seamans and Zhu, 2011).”
BackgroundOpening the Floodgates: The Implications of Increasing Platform Openness in Crowdfunding
Wessel, M., Thies, F., & Benlian, A. (2017) · Journal of Information Technology · doi:10.1057/s41265-017-0040-z · Cited by 108 · see citing works
“from the participation of the respective other group (Ondrus et al., 2015; Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005; Rysman, 2009).”
BackgroundChoosing a Digital Content Strategy: How Much Should Be Free?
Halbheer, D., Stahl, F., Koenigsberg, O., & Lehmann, D. R. (2013) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-88079-7_19 · Cited by 103 · see citing works
An Empirical Taxonomy of Crowdfunding Intermediaries
Haas, P., Blohm, I., & Leimeister, J. M. (2014) · Alexandria (UniSG) (University of St.Gallen) · Cited by 117 · see citing works
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“…also contain more than two sides, and that they can coexist with a traditional one-sided merchant business model in an overarching selling strategy (Rysman 2009), the investigation of these different types of platforms and the underlying business models, respectively, constitutes a second field for…”
InfluentialNewspapers in Times of Low Advertising Revenues
Angelucci, C., & Cagé, J. (2019) · American Economic Journal Microeconomics · doi:10.1257/mic.20170306 · Cited by 126 · see citing works
Why Discrete Price Fragments U.S. Stock Exchanges and Disperses Their Fee Structures
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E-books: A Tale of Digital Disruption
Gilbert, R. J. (2015) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.29.3.165 · Cited by 104 · see citing works
“A key characteristic of a two-sided market is that purchases of one component affect consumers who purchase the other component (Rysman 2009).”
BackgroundCredit Rating Agencies: An Overview
White, L. J. (2013) · Annual Review of Financial Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-financial-110112-120942 · Cited by 102 · see citing works
“For a more general discussion of two-sided markets, see, e.g., Rysman (2009).”
BackgroundAn Institutional Logics Perspective on the Gig Economy
Frenken, K., Vaskelainen, T., Fünfschilling, L., & Piscicelli, L. (2020) · Theorizing the Sharing Economy: Variety and Trajectories of New Forms of Organizing · doi:10.1108/s0733-558x20200000066005 · Cited by 118 · see citing works
Multi-Sided PlatformsPreprint
Hagiu, A., & Wright, J. (2015) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2794582 · Cited by 1,053 · see citing works
“Both approaches have limitations (see Rysman, 2009).”
InfluentialDushnitsky, G., Piva, E., & Rossi‐Lamastra, C. (2020) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.3163 · Cited by 100 · see citing works
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Orchestration and governance in digital platform ecosystems: a literature review and trends
Mukhopadhyay, S., & Bouwman, H. (2019) · Digital Policy Regulation and Governance · doi:10.1108/dprg-11-2018-0067 · Cited by 97 · see citing works
Mobile Computing: The Next Platform Rivalry
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“This is the form most studied in the two-sided market literature (Rysman (2009).)”
BackgroundThe Economics of Ownership, Access and Trade in Digital DataPreprint
Duch‐Brown, N., Martens, B., & Mueller‐Langer, F. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.2914144 · Cited by 92 · see citing works
Towards a sharing economy – Innovating ecologies of business models
Boons, F., & Bocken, N. M. P. (2018) · Technological Forecasting and Social Change · doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2018.06.031 · Cited by 92 · see citing works
“This interpretation also forms the basis for some of the current work on sharing business models, which looks at platforms and multi-sided markets (Rysman, 2009).”
BackgroundPrecarious and Productive Work in the Digital Economy
Coyle, D. (2017) · National Institute Economic Review · doi:10.1177/002795011724000110 · Cited by 90 · see citing works
“Surveys can be found in Rysman (2009), Evans (2011), and Parker et al. (2016).”
BackgroundPlatform governance and the rural–urban divide: Sellers' responses to design change
Koo, W. W.-Y., & Eesley, C. E. (2020) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.3259 · Cited by 88 · see citing works
Unraveling Platform Strategies: A Review from an Organizational Ambidexterity Perspective
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“Moreover, platform owners can take a step further and facilitate, or limit, participation in the ecosystem based on inter-platform compatibility decisions [63].”
BackgroundConsumer Cash Usage: A Cross-Country Comparison with Payment Diary Survey DataPreprint
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Platforms, Power, and Promotion: Evidence from Spotify Playlists*
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“There is a large theoretical literature on platforms (see Rysman, 2009 for a summary) and a growing body of theoretical work on platform incentives to bias (Hagiu and Jullien, 2011; Cornière and Taylor, 2014).”
BackgroundWhy payment card fees are biased against retailers
Wright, J. (2012) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12007 · Cited by 82 · see citing works
“The rapidly expanding literature on multi-sided platforms (e.g., Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Armstrong, 2006; Rysman, 2009; Weyl 2010) has cast some doubt over these concerns, noting that skewed pricing often arises (e.”
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Transforming into a platform provider: strategic options for industrial smart service providers
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Two-sided markets, pricing, and network effects
Jullien, B., Pavan, A., & Rysman, M. (2021) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/bs.hesind.2021.11.007 · Cited by 86 · see citing works
Self-citationInsulated Platform CompetitionPreprint
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“Rysman (Rysman, 2009) also used the expression ‘two-sided strategies’ to convey the idea that there are choices made by agents rather than an imposed endogenous industry structure.”
Platforms: a multiplicity of research opportunities
Sriram, S., Manchanda, P., Esteban-Bravo, M., Chu, J., Ma, L., Song, M., Shriver, S. K., & Subramanian, U. (2014) · Marketing Letters · doi:10.1007/s11002-014-9314-1 · Cited by 83 · see citing works
“4.1 Unanswered theoretical and conceptual questions Empirical research on platforms has mostly focused on pricing decisions (e.g., Rysman 2009).”
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“According to Rysman (2009), “[a]s this distinction often depends on the decisions of the intermediary rather than on purely technological features of the market, it may be better to use the term `two-sided strategies` rather than `two-sided markets`.””
InfluentialNetwork effects in online two-sided market platforms: A research note
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Prices and Subsidies in the Sharing Economy
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“This lack of understanding exists despite a large literature in economics studying two-sided markets, e.g., [31, 34, 29].”
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“Similar to more traditional service companies, however, platform companies are dependent on developing a large customer base in order to create a defensible market position and eventually reach profitability (Rysman 2009).”
BackgroundInter-Platform Competition in a Regulated Ride-Hail Market With Pooling
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- Authors
- Rysman, M.
- Affiliations
- Boston University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Rysman, Marc
- ORCID
- Rysman, Marc
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2009-08-01
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 125-143
- ISSN
- 0895-3309 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1982461819
- Semantic Scholar
- 1c0c366611a5049d783edb97c8fce22b666c4622
- Cited by
- 1,261
- References
- 71
- Citations by year
- 2026: 68 · 2025: 74 · 2024: 77 · 2023: 93 · 2022: 85 · 2021: 95 · 2020: 124 · 2019: 92 · 2018: 87 · 2017: 70 · 2016: 81 · 2015: 57 · 2014: 72 · 2013: 76 · 2012: 47
- FWCI
- 103.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- other-oa
- Locations
- The Journal of Economic Perspectives (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Digital Platforms and Economics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Merger and Competition Analysis
- Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Marketing › Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing
- Keywords
- two-sided markets, platform intermediaries, network effects, externalities, payment cards, video game consoles, operating systems, competition policy, regulation, public policy, consumer electronics, search engines
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-11.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-11.
Cited sources are checked by gpt-6-sol.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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