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Moral Satisficing: Rethinking Moral Behavior as Bounded Rationality
Open accessAbstract
What is the nature of moral behavior? According to the study of bounded rationality, it results not from character traits or rational deliberation alone, but from the interplay between mind and environment. In this view, moral behavior is based on pragmatic social heuristics rather than moral rules or maximization principles. These social heuristics are not good or bad per se, but solely in relation to the environments in which they are used. This has methodological implications for the study of morality: Behavior needs to be studied in social groups as well as in isolation, in natural environments as well as in labs. It also has implications for moral policy: Only by accepting the fact that behavior is a function of both mind and environmental structures can realistic prescriptive means of achieving moral goals be developed.
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Cited by
Gigerenzer, G., & Gaissmaier, W. (2011) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346 · Cited by 4,037
Self-citationAn Overview of Artificial Intelligence Ethics
Huang, C., Zhang, Z., Mao, B., & Yao, X. (2023) · IEEE Transactions on Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1109/tai.2022.3194503 · Cited by 482
Dixon, J., Levine, M., Reicher, S., & Durrheim, K. (2012) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11002214 · Cited by 433
A solution to the mysteries of morality.
DeScioli, P., & Kurzban, R. (2013) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0029065 · Cited by 289
Palazzo, G., Krings, F., & Hoffrage, U. (2012) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-011-1130-4 · Cited by 263
Metadata
- Authors
- Gigerenzer, G.
- Venue
- Topics in Cognitive Science
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2010-05-12
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 528-554
- ISSN
- 1756-8757 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2118411866
- Cited by
- 277
- References
- 105
- FWCI
- 10.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.