Cited by 95Embodied and Extended CognitionPhilosophy and History of SciencePhilosophy and Theoretical Science

Philosophy for the Rest of Cognitive Science

Stepp, Nigel, Chemero, Anthony, Turvey, Michael T.·2011·Topics in Cognitive Science

Abstract

Cognitive science has always included multiple methodologies and theoretical commitments. The philosophy of cognitive science should embrace, or at least acknowledge, this diversity. Bechtel's (2009a) proposed philosophy of cognitive science, however, applies only to representationalist and mechanist cognitive science, ignoring the substantial minority of dynamically oriented cognitive scientists. As an example of nonrepresentational, dynamical cognitive science, we describe strong anticipation as a model for circadian systems (Stepp & Turvey, 2009). We then propose a philosophy of science appropriate to nonrepresentational, dynamical cognitive science.

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Crossref · 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2011.01143.x

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2 of 2 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Proponents of the ecological approach have argued for pluralism within cognitive science in order to make room for ecological psychology.

    “Proponents of the ecological approach have been arguing for pluralism within cognitive science to make room for ecological psychology.”

    From Productive pluralism: The coming of age of ecological psychology. (2024) · cites this paper as Stepp et al., 2011

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Authors
Stepp, N., Chemero, A., & Turvey, M. T.
Affiliations
  • Haskins Laboratories (US)
  • Franklin & Marshall College (US)
Corresponding author
Stepp, Nigel
Venue
Topics in Cognitive Science
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2011-04
Volume
3
Issue
2
Pages
425-437
ISSN
  • 1756-8757 (ISSN-L)
  • 1756-8765
OpenAlex
W2086171626
Cited by
95
References
2
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 10 · 2019: 10 · 2018: 5 · 2017: 8 · 2016: 9 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 7 · 2013: 4 · 2012: 4
FWCI
2.60
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Topics in Cognitive Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • National Institutes of Health
  • National Institute of Child Health and Human Development
  • Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (HD-01994, P01HD001994)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy and History of Science
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Keywords
philosophy of cognitive science, representationalism, mechanicism, circadian system, philosophy of science
MeSH terms
Circadian Rhythm, Cognition, Humans, Models, Theoretical, Philosophy, Cognitive Science

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