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Cited by 317

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Realism and Human Kinds

THOMASSON, AMIE L.·2003·Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

Abstract

It is often noted that institutional objects and artifacts depend on human beliefs and intentions and so fail to meet the realist paradigm of mind‐independent objects. In this paper I draw out exactly in what ways the thesis of mind‐independence fails, and show that it has some surprising consequences. For the specific forms of mind‐dependence involved entail that we have certain forms of epistemic privilege with regard to our own institutional and artifactual kinds, protecting us from certain possibilities of ignorance and error; they also demonstrate that not all cases of reference to these kinds can proceed along a purely causal model. As a result, realist views in ontology, epistemology, and semantics that were developed with natural scientific kinds in mind cannot fully apply to the kinds of the social and human sciences. In closing I consider some wider consequences of these results for social science and philosophy.

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Metadata

Authors
THOMASSON, A. L.
Venue
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2003-11
Volume
67
Issue
3
Pages
580-609
ISSN
  • 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
  • 1933-1592
OpenAlex
W1994326792
Cited by
317
References
29
FWCI
25.48
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Realism and Human Kinds. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00309.x
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THOMASSON, A. L. (2003). Realism and Human Kinds. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00309.x

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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