The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Realism and Human Kinds
Abstract
It is often noted that institutional objects and artifacts depend on human beliefs and intentions and so fail to meet the realist paradigm of mind‐independent objects. In this paper I draw out exactly in what ways the thesis of mind‐independence fails, and show that it has some surprising consequences. For the specific forms of mind‐dependence involved entail that we have certain forms of epistemic privilege with regard to our own institutional and artifactual kinds, protecting us from certain possibilities of ignorance and error; they also demonstrate that not all cases of reference to these kinds can proceed along a purely causal model. As a result, realist views in ontology, epistemology, and semantics that were developed with natural scientific kinds in mind cannot fully apply to the kinds of the social and human sciences. In closing I consider some wider consequences of these results for social science and philosophy.
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Cites
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Kripke, S. A. (1972) · Semantics of Natural Language · doi:10.1007/978-94-010-2557-7_9 · Cited by 7,028
ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SOCIAL REALITY
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A taxonomy of illocutionary acts
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Cited by
Thomasson, A. L. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195319910.001.0001 · Cited by 490
Self-citationBaker, L. R. (2004) · Philosophical Explorations · doi:10.1080/13869790410001694462 · Cited by 166
Metadata
- Authors
- THOMASSON, A. L.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2003-11
- Volume
- 67
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 580-609
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- 1933-1592
- OpenAlex
- W1994326792
- Cited by
- 317
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 25.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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