Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First‐Person Perspective.
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Abstract
Dan Zahavi Cambridge, MA, and London, UK: The MIT Press, A Bradford Book, 2006. Pp. vii, 265. ISBN 0-262-24050-5 In Subjectivity and Selfhood Zahavi puts the phenomenological tradition into dialogue with contemporary analytic philosophy and psychological research to argue for a conception of self-consciousness and consciousness of others. The book is remarkable for the range and variety packed into its relatively modest length, and for its success in bringing so many (sometimes disparate) voices into a unified discussion. Though a more sustained treatment of many of the issues would be needed for full defense of his position, Zahavi provides a valuable example of how continental and analytic traditions can be combined with one another and with empirical research to help define and support a far-reaching and forward-looking philosophical viewpoint. First and foremost, Zahavi believes we need to see that essential to all phenomenally conscious experience is a “minimal” form of “non-objectifying” self-consciousness—a “pre-reflective self-consciousness,” a kind of “self-acquaintance” or “familiarity”—that is distinct from the sort of “thematized,”“conceptualized” reflection involved in “objectifying” thoughts about oneself and one’s own experience. A recognition of this is essential, Zahavi maintains, to understanding both consciousness simpliciter and the kind of reflective, objectifying self-consciousness that must be distinguished from it. Further, this minimal self-consciousness brings with it a minimal type of selfhood that makes available other, more advanced (e.g., narrative) forms. Finally, turning to intersubjectivity, Zahavi argues we need to recognize basic forms of awareness of others that must be distinguished from the forms derived from them—as when we try to infer others’ states of mind from our observations. Zahavi begins with a sympathetic exposition of Sartre’s claim that all consciousness is “pre-reflective consciousness” of itself, along with his associated “non-egological” view of consciousness. Arguing from these and related ideas found in Husserl, Zahavi makes the case that all consciousness is (non-objectifying) self-consciousness. He relies importantly on two lines of reasoning—an “argument by elimination,” (p. 24) and an examination of regress problems associated with consciousness (pp. 24–29). The former argument turns on the idea that it is impossible to “consciously experience something without in some way having access to or being acquainted with the experience in question.” Higher-order theories of consciousness fail in their efforts to account for this essential first-person givenness in terms of objectifying thoughts or inner perceptions directed upon one’s mental life, because they fail to properly distinguish cases where we attend to our own conscious experiences from those where we do not. Thus we are left with recognition of an essential non-objectifying self-acquaintance as the only viable option. Zahavi’s use of regress considerations here is complex; its most distinctive feature lies perhaps in its appeal to the idea (derived from Shoemaker) that self-awareness requires “self-reference without identification” (pp. 27–28). Zahavi uses this to argue that self-reference presupposes a non-objectifying self-acquaintance. The notion of pre-reflective self-consciousness that Zahavi develops in Chapters 1–3 forms an important basis for the rest of his discussion. In Chapter 4, he considers a challenge to first-person reflection as inevitably bringing a distortion of the (necessarily unobjectifiable) subjective character of experience. He endorses something like what he sees as Heidegger’s response to Natorp’s articulation of this concern. While reflection can distort one’s experience, a non-distorting, “hermeneutical” kind of thought about experience is possible that proceeds appropriately from one’s pre-reflective self-understanding (which Zahavi identifies with first-person givenness). In Chapter 5, Zahavi’s central concept of first-person givenness plays a critical role in explaining different notions of self. He distinguishes what he calls the “minimal” or “core” self—“the self as an experiential dimension”—both from the (Kantian) notion of self as a identical possessor of changing experiences, and the (more recent) notion of self as the subject of (and perhaps “construction” out of) a narrative or life-story. Zahavi defends his notion of the minimal self, and puts it forward as a “replacement” for the Kantian notion of self, and a necessary condition of the narrative variety. Appealing to the idiom of analytic philosophy of mind, Zahavi holds that to have conscious experience in the phenomenal, “what it’s like” sense is for experience to be first-personally given in his sense, and this is also just what it is to have a minimal or core self. He argues that having such a minimal self provides a needed “experiential support” for the narrative self, without which one’s narrative
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Metadata
- Authors
- SIEWERT, C.
- Venue
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2008-10-23
- Volume
- 77
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 840-843
- ISSN
- 0031-8205 (ISSN-L)
- 1933-1592
- OpenAlex
- W1529997575
- Cited by
- 115
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 0.00
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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