The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
IDENTIFYING SOCIAL NORMS USING COORDINATION GAMES: WHY DOES DICTATOR GAME SHARING VARY?
Open accessAbstract
We introduce an incentivized elicitation method for identifying social norms that uses simple coordination games. We demonstrate that concern for the norms we elicit and for money predict changes in behavior across several variants of the dictator game, including data from a novel experiment and from prior published laboratory studies, that are unaccounted for by most current theories of social preferences. Moreover, we find that the importance of social norm compliance and of monetary considerations is fairly constant across different experiments. This consistency allows prediction of treatment effects across experiments, and implies that subjects have a generally stable willingness to sacrifice money to take behaviors that are socially appropriate.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?
Levitt, S. D., & List, J. A. (2007) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.21.2.153 · Cited by 2,668
Normative foundations of human cooperation
Fehr, E., & Schurtenberger, I. (2018) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0385-5 · Cited by 434
The Impact of Relative Standards on the Propensity to Disclose
Acquisti, A., John, L. K., & Loewenstein, G. (2012) · Journal of Marketing Research · doi:10.1509/jmr.09.0215 · Cited by 247
Motivated Bayesians: Feeling Moral While Acting Egoistically
Gino, F., Norton, M. I., & Weber, R. A. (2016) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.30.3.189 · Cited by 208
Self-citationStrategic Ignorance and the Robustness of Social Preferences
Grossman, Z. (2014) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2014.1989 · Cited by 176
Increasing altruistic and cooperative behaviour with simple moral nudges
Capraro, V., Jagfeld, G., Klein, R., Mul, M., & de Pol, I. V. (2019) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-019-48094-4 · Cited by 135
Method Matters: The Underreporting of Intimate Partner Violence
Cullen, C. (2023) · The World Bank Economic Review · doi:10.1093/wber/lhac022 · Cited by 116
Uncertainty about the impact of social decisions increases prosocial behaviour
Kappes, A., Nussberger, A.-M., Faber, N. S., Kahane, G., Savulescu, J., & Crockett, M. J. (2018) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-018-0372-x · Cited by 79
Barreiro-Hurle, J., Dessart, F. J., Rommel, J., Czajkowski, M., Espinosa-Goded, M., Rodriguez-Entrena, M., Thomas, F., & Zagorska, K. (2023) · Food Policy · doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2023.102481 · Cited by 37
Trust within human-machine collectives depends on the perceived consensus about cooperative norms
Makovi, K., Sargsyan, A., Li, W., Bonnefon, J.-F., & Rahwan, T. (2023) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-023-38592-5 · Cited by 36
The normative permissiveness of political partyism
Lane, T., Miller, L., & Rodriguez, I. (2024) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104661 · Cited by 12
Metadata
- Authors
- Krupka, E. L., & Weber, R. A.
- Venue
- Journal of the European Economic Association
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2013-06
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 495-524
- ISSN
- 1542-4766 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3125258780
- Cited by
- 995
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 87.58
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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