The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Duration of Executive Compensation
Open accessAbstract
Extensive discussions on the inefficiencies of “short‐termism” in executive compensation notwithstanding, little is known empirically about the extent of such short‐termism. We develop a novel measure of executive pay duration that reflects the vesting periods of different pay components, thereby quantifying the extent to which compensation is short‐term. We calculate pay duration in various industries and document its correlation with firm characteristics. Pay duration is longer in firms with more growth opportunities, more long‐term assets, greater R&D intensity, lower risk, and better recent stock performance. Longer CEO pay duration is negatively related to the extent of earnings‐increasing accruals.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations
Jones, J. J. (1991) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491047 · Cited by 8,353
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
The economic implications of corporate financial reporting
Graham, J. R., Harvey, C. R., & Rajgopal, S. (2005) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2005.01.002 · Cited by 6,316
Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., & Larcker, D. F. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(98)00058-0 · Cited by 4,335
Managerial incentives and risk-taking☆
COLES, J., DANIEL, N., & NAVEEN, L. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.09.004 · Cited by 2,909
What Matters in Corporate Governance?
Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A., & Ferrell, A. (2009) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn099 · Cited by 2,906
CEO incentives and earnings management
Bergstresser, D. B. (2004) · Cited by 2,392
Financial accounting information and corporate governance
Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. J. (2001) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(01)00027-1 · Cited by 2,283
Executive compensation as an agency problem
Bebchuk, L. A., & Fried, J. M. (2009) · The Economic Nature of the Firm · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511817410.026 · Cited by 2,282
Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect Information in Accruals and Cash Flows About Future Earnings?
Sloan, R. G. (1996) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/tar-9608042309 · Cited by 1,956
Cited by
Embedding environment and sustainability into corporate financial decision‐making
Siegrist, M., Bowman, G., Mervine, E., & Southam, C. (2020) · Accounting & Finance · doi:10.1111/acfi.12533 · Cited by 87
Metadata
- Authors
- GOPALAN, R., MILBOURN, T., SONG, F., & THAKOR, A. V.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2014-11-10
- Volume
- 69
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2777-2817
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2127257964
- Cited by
- 346
- References
- 44
- FWCI
- 75.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Duration of Executive Compensation. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/jofi.12085
- The paper
- GOPALAN, R., MILBOURN, T., SONG, F., & THAKOR, A. V. (2014). Duration of Executive Compensation. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12085
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
