The DOI matches its Crossref record; 82 of the 82 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
CEO Connectedness and Corporate Fraud
Abstract
We find that connections CEOs develop with top executives and directors through their appointment decisions increase the risk of corporate fraud. Appointment‐based CEO connectedness in executive suites and boardrooms increases the likelihood of committing fraud and decreases the likelihood of detection. Additionally, it decreases the expected costs of fraud by helping conceal fraudulent activity, making CEO dismissal less likely upon discovery, and lowering the coordination costs of carrying out illegal activity. Connections based on network ties through past employment, education, or social organization memberships have insignificant effects on fraud. Appointment‐based CEO connectedness warrants attention from regulators, investors, and corporate governance specialists.
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Cited by
Corporate ESG performance and manager misconduct: Evidence from China
He, F., Du, H., & Yu, B. (2022) · International Review of Financial Analysis · doi:10.1016/j.irfa.2022.102201 · Cited by 447
Amiram, D., Bozanic, Z., Cox, J. D., Dupont, Q., Karpoff, J. M., & Sloan, R. (2018) · Review of Accounting Studies · doi:10.1007/s11142-017-9435-x · Cited by 422
The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct
Egan, M., Matvos, G., & Seru, A. (2019) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/700735 · Cited by 410
Female board representation, corporate innovation and firm performance
Chen, J., Leung, W. S., & Evans, K. P. (2018) · Journal of Empirical Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jempfin.2018.07.003 · Cited by 326
Hoi, C. K., Wu, Q., & Zhang, H. (2019) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.02.009 · Cited by 322
Metadata
- Authors
- KHANNA, V., KIM, E. H., & LU, Y.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2015-05-11
- Volume
- 70
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1203-1252
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2749749198
- Cited by
- 633
- References
- 82
- FWCI
- 117.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.