The DOI matches its Crossref record; 34 of the 34 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Leverage Ratchet Effect
Abstract
Firms’ inability to commit to future funding choices has profound consequences for capital structure dynamics. With debt in place, shareholders pervasively resist leverage reductions no matter how much such reductions may enhance firm value. Shareholders would instead choose to increase leverage even if the new debt is junior and would reduce firm value. These asymmetric forces in leverage adjustments, which we call the leverage ratchet effect, cause equilibrium leverage outcomes to be history‐dependent. If forced to reduce leverage, shareholders are biased toward selling assets relative to potentially more efficient alternatives such as pure recapitalizations.
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Citations
Cites
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Buchak, G., Matvos, G., Piskorski, T., & Seru, A. (2018) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.03.011 · Cited by 1,784
Risk management, firm reputation, and the impact of successful cyberattacks on target firms
Kamiya, S., Kang, J.-K., Kim, J., Milidonis, A., & Stulz, R. M. (2021) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.05.019 · Cited by 497
Banks Response to Higher Capital Requirements: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment
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Metadata
- Authors
- ADMATI, A. R., DEMARZO, P. M., HELLWIG, M. F., & PFLEIDERER, P.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2017-12-14
- Volume
- 73
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 145-198
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W2899124511
- Cited by
- 286
- References
- 34
- FWCI
- 87.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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