The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Aptness of Anger
Abstract
A long philosophical and political tradition holds that victims of injustice ought not get angry because doing so would be counterproductive. But this tradition neglects the possibility that anger \nmight be counterproductive and yet apt. What ought a victim of injustice do when her anger would worsen her situation but nonetheless be a fitting response to the state of the world? Here reasons of prudence and reasons \nof aptness come apart, generating, I argue, a substantive normative conflict. Two things, I suggest, follow. First, the counterproductivity critic faces the burden of explaining why, in such conflicts, prudential \nconsiderations trump considerations of aptness; until this burden is met, there is no obvious inference to be made from the counterproductivity of one’s anger to an all-things-considered prohibition on one’s getting angry. \nSecond, it’s plausible that such conflicts – where victims of oppression must choose between getting aptly angry or acting prudentially – themselves constitute a form of unrecognised injustice, what I call affective \ninjustice. I conclude by discussing the prospects for alleviating affective injustice in the political sphere, and offering a diagnosis of our reluctance to make room, in our politics, for anger.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation.
Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.98.2.224 · Cited by 21,995
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing
Fricker, M. (2007) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237907.001.0001 · Cited by 9,198
Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980
Williams, B. (1981) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139165860 · Cited by 3,068
The politics of reality : essays in feminist theory
Frye, M. (1983) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,622
Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology
Jaggar, A. M. (1989) · Inquiry · doi:10.1080/00201748908602185 · Cited by 1,397
What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories
Griffiths, P. E. (1997) · University of Chicago Press eBooks · doi:10.7208/chicago/9780226308760.001.0001 · Cited by 1,151
Emotion regulation and culture: are the social consequences of emotion suppression culture-specific?
Butler, E. A., Lee, T. L., & Gross, J. J. (2007) · Emotion · doi:10.1037/1528-3542.7.1.30 · Cited by 986 · cited 1×
“48On cultural variation in emotions and their expression, see e.g., Markus and Kitayama 1991; Butler et al. 2007; Friedlmeier et al. 2011.”
BackgroundDeonna, J., & Teroni, F. (2012) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203721742 · Cited by 692
Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave, Written by Himself (1845)
(2014) · American Slavery · doi:10.5040/9798400612282.ch-001 · Cited by 473
Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles
Tessman, L. (2005) · doi:10.1093/0195179145.001.0001 · Cited by 372
Cited by
Brady, W. J., Crockett, M. J., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2020) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691620917336 · Cited by 417
Williams, R., & Liebling, A. (2023) · The British Journal of Criminology · doi:10.1093/bjc/azab122 · Cited by 39
WARD, C. (2020) · Journal of the American Philosophical Association · doi:10.1017/apa.2020.4 · Cited by 19
The Moral Psychological Justification of Anger: An Exploration of Self-Respect and Recognition
Zhang, J., Xiong, Z., Zheng, H., & Ma, X. (2024) · Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.3390/bs15010003 · Cited by 9
Betrayed Expectations: Misdirected Anger and the Preservation of Ideology
Emerick, B., & Yap, A. (2023) · Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy · doi:10.26556/jesp.v24i3.1615 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Srinivasan, A.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Philosophy
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2017-07-09
- Volume
- 26
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 123-144
- ISSN
- 0963-8016 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-9760
- OpenAlex
- W2701757763
- Cited by
- 484
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 70.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Aptness of Anger. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/jopp.12130
- The paper
- Srinivasan, A. (2018). The Aptness of Anger. Journal of Political Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12130
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.